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ABSTRACT 
As the Internet of Things grows in demand, various vendors continue to create new devices and 
products that exchange data and operate remotely. These new products and features may include 
security risks if not properly mitigated, potentially compromising personally identifiable 
information. Current literature reveals the need to utilize proper security measures and a process 
to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and availability to prevent and/or limit malicious actions. If 
information security is missing any part of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability triad, then 
the information system or device will not be fully secured. The approach discussed in this 
research project was to develop a new security framework entitled riskless Internet of Things 
security standard (RIOTSS). The intended purpose of the RIOTSS is to create a framework 
based on security standards, industry best practices, policies, and procedures that vendors and 
manufactures can implement into their production of IoT devices to prevent or limit security 
weaknesses being introduced into the productions of IoT device products while also offering 
mitigating procedures that the vendor or manufactures can implemented in a secure manner 
without restricting device functionality or capability. 
 
Keywords: Fitbit threats, wearable technology security, wearable technology vulnerabilities, 
Bluetooth threats, wearable privacy, Bluetooth, security 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
With the advancement of technology and the increased interest in the Internet of Things 
(IoT), a wide array of devices is being produced by a variety of vendors. Because of the quick 
increase in these devices, it is possible that the developers are not adhering to security best 
practices, or even engineering these devices with security in mind from the beginning. One area 
in IoT that has become a hot topic for research is the security of wearable technology. This 
research project investigated whether IoT devices adhere to industry security standards, user 
privacy is adequately protected, and if the proper security measures are integrated into these 
devices. 
Motivation 
Society today is connected via a multitude of devices to the IoT. Google defines the IoT 
as “the way in which everyday objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and 
receive data” (https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define+internet+of+things). An average 
person connects their smartphone to their home, available Wi-Fi networks, and short-range 
devices (SRD), including a variety of Bluetooth-enabled devices. These devices may include an 
automobile, speakers, headsets, gaming consoles, computers, tablets, and other wearable 
technology, such as a smartwatch or fitness monitoring device. Researches from KU Leuven 
University Heverlee described IoT as a unique approach or method that allows for society to 
interact with various environments and devices through an individual’s normal daily routine [1]. 
With all these different networks and transmission methods able to interact with a wide 
range of systems and devices that have a wide range of functionality and capability, it is essential 
to ensure devices are hardened prior to their release. Some of these devices monitor and secure 
personal space, some regulate and control the inner workings of homes and buildings, while still 
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others track and store personally identifiable information (PII). If malicious individuals were to 
gain access to data from these devices, the user’s property, and the user’s PII would be a risk. In 
addition, if bad actors gained control of IoT devices it is possible these bad actors could use these 
IoT devices as part of a botnet as shown by the use of an: 
array of IoT devices used in botnets to clobber parts of the Internet. One of the most 
stunning examples was last years’ Mirai botnet of cameras and baby monitors that took 
down Dyn resulting in loss of connectivity for Netflix, Reddit, Twitter, CNN, and others. 
[2]  
IoT devices control and monitor assets within the transportation industry while others are used 
within the medical field. If malicious users gain access to or control of medical IoT devices, it 
could disrupt patient monitoring, medical procedures, or patient treatment causing a great risk for 
these medical patients; one “example includes implanted medical devices, which can kill people, 
let alone be used to infect hospital systems” [2] 
The general public has limited knowledge regarding proper security measures for such 
devices, so they rely on industry to create products with these measures fully integrated. Since 
these devices are available and used by the public, it is essential industry engineers these devices 
using best security practices with a security framework and standards that ensure the product 
prevents, or at least limits, an attacker’s ability to compromise the device. The consumer has a 
role in ensuring their IoT devices are adequately secured. The user must ensure the device is 
properly maintained and operated in a safe and secure manner. To do this, the consumer should 
adhere to a few simple security precautions, included in the recommendations of this writing. 
In the past, research has focused on the security of some devices, with limited research 
focusing on the security aspects of newer wearable devices. This project analyzed IoT security 
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related to IoT devices as a whole to determine if any security best practice, framework, or 
standards should be used and how using these improve the overall security of these devices. 
Problem Statement 
IoT is becoming more popular and entwined with everyday life; more users obtain 
devices, and IoT security deficiencies are becoming a more substantial risk. As the world moves 
to an IoT platform, security in this realm is of the utmost importance and is not being addressed. 
These security weaknesses are exploited by nefarious individuals and are not easily remediated 
by any one security standard, best practice, or framework. To this end, a new framework called 
the riskless Internet of Things security standard (RIOTSS), will be developed to enhance existing 
security for IoT devices by addressing known and discovered shortcomings.  The objective of 
this project is to develop RIOTSS in order to analyze current security frameworks for gaps 
related to IoT devices and to provide a high-level overview of security concerns relates to IoT 
devices, by meeting the following objectives: 
• O1: To construct a standard framework that allows for uniformity and reusability 
when conducting security assessments and threat analyses, 
• O2: To apply a standard framework that has the ability to use resources more 
efficiently, 
• O3: To develop a process to increase security and data protection for IoT devices, 
including mitigation of findings from security assessments and threat analyses, and 
• O4: To create method to increase the security level of IoT devices through data 
encryption, secure network connections, best practices, and industry standards. 
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RIOTSS attempts to detect and analyze known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and 
attempts to uncover unknown threats in IoT devices.  The goal of this research is to develop and 
implement RIOTSS a security framework to increase IoT devices security. RIOTSS also 
provides proper mitigation procedures: 
• Detect and analyzes known vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and attempts to uncover 
unknown threats; 
• Develop and implement a standard security framework (RIOTSS) used to secure IoT 
devices; and 
• Provide proper mitigation procedures for discovered findings. 
Expected Contributions 
 The contributions of this research are divided into two categories: uniformity/reusability, 
and hardening/security. The main contribution for uniformity/reusability was the creation and 
development of a new IoT framework that reduces resources and efforts needed to complete a 
security assessment and threat analysis for this project. Using this new framework, this project 
identified and mitigated threats in less time. Contributions in this area include the creation of an 
IoT security framework and the development of a standard for discover of vulnerabilities during 
the production and manufacturing of IoT devices. These contributions include: 
• C1: the development of an IoT security framework to be used while conducting a security 
assessment and threat analysis, 
• C2: the development of a framework for vulnerabilities and threats discovery, 
• C3: performing a gap analysis on various other frameworks and standards to conduct 
security risk assessment and threat analysis to determine benefits that each of these 
frameworks and standards offer. 
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The main contribution for hardening/securing was ensuring that proper security 
hardening practices were implemented within this study of IoT devices. Some security hardening 
methods include using updates, patches, and applying industry standards. These include data 
encryption, securing network connections, implementing updated patches during production, and 
implementation of best practices and industry standards throughout development. The 
contributions of this research project included: 
• offer vendors and manufactures of IoT devices a method to ensure that IoT devices 
are properly patched and current security protocols are integrated into the IoT devices 
before being released, 
• offers a method for IoT devices to be evaluated to determine if these IoT devices are 
properly hardened and have integrated security best practices prior to being release, 
and 
• offers a method of determining if threats and weaknesses were properly mitigated 
during the production of IoT devices, with the use of RIOTSS framework. 
Organization of Research Project 
Chapter 2 discusses related works and is focused on a literature review of wearable 
technology, standards, and end-user training related to the IoT environment.  Chapter 3 looks and 
complies numerous security stands that will be used to build RIOTTS. Chapter 4 discusses the 
building of RIOTSS.  Chapter 5 analyzes the framework and standards that will be used within 
RIOTSS. Chapter 6 analyzes the frameworks and standards used within RIOTSS for weakness 
and GAPS when used for assessing IoT devices.  Chapter 7 is a proof of concept risk assessment 
on an Applewatch to show that RIOTSS framework complete risk assessment solution for IoT 
devices.  Chapter 8 discusses future work, lessons learned and project conclusions..  
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 
The current research on wearable technology was studied for applicability to the security 
of standards of wearable devices within the IoT environment. For the purpose of the project, the 
areas reviewed included Bluetooth standards and threats, wearable technology security, and past 
research conducted on the Fitbit. The findings were analyzed, and the results were extrapolated 
and applied to the broader aspect within the IoT. The Fitbit is an early, popular precursor to the 
Microsoft Band 2, a current trending device under study. 
IoT Technology 
 This section reviews the technology that is incorporated and integrated within the IoT 
industry and reviews some of the newer IoT devises introduced into the marketplace for 2017. 
Technology Used Within Wearable Device of IoT 
The technology used by some of the newly introduced wearable items is the same or 
similar to that of other wearable or smart devices. Some technology is relatively new to the 
marketplace while some has been implemented and used in different markets for years. The 
following synopsis reveals the technical specifications for a few wearables and other popular 
devices: 
• RunIQ smartwatch by New Balance uses an Intel Atom processor running Android Wear 
2.0 operating system (OS) and incorporates GPS, accelerometer, heart rate, and 
gyroscope sensors, and Bluetooth [3]. 
• Apple Watch 2 by Apple uses a dual processor OSI 10.1 OS and includes GPS, heart rate, 
accelerometer, gyroscope, ambient light sensor, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth [3]. 
• Gear Fit 2 by Samsung uses a dual processor and includes GPS, heart rate, accelerometer, 
gyroscope, ambient light sensor, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth [3]. 
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The technology used is similar; these devices use an embedded system and power-constrained 
operating system with similar features and sensors. Some minor differences include a battery, 
overall device size, and water resistance. Wearable and smart technology devices have the 
capability to use one or more methods to communicate and transmit data to other devices; this 
could be Bluetooth, Bluetooth low-energy (i.e., BTLE version 4.0, 4.1 or 4.2), Wi-Fi (i.e., 
802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g or a combination), low-rate, wireless, personal area network (LR-
WPAN), other 802.15.4 methods, infra-red, or radio frequency identification (RFID). 
Using one of the methods above, devices transmit data to a variety of endpoints. Some of 
the wearable and smart devices have two-way communication to send and receive data. These 
data could be anything from simple alerts or notifications to text/email messages or cellular calls. 
With the various components integrated into these devices, it is vital to ensure that 
individual items that could have vulnerabilities are not being introduced into the completed 
product. This increases the security of these devices and decreases the vulnerability to the patient 
and user. If vulnerable individual components are installed into these devices, it also places the 
data and information stored and transmitted at risk; this is why it is essential to create a 
framework, similar to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) framework, that can be built to 
create a trust system within the development lifecycle and supply chain. If this could be 
accomplished, it would create a more secure device for the patient or user, which in turn, creates 
a trust model between the patients/users and the vendor/manufacturer. 
Since Microsoft’s Band 2 was a device that used similar technology, preliminary research 
was performed on this device for this study. The motivation for this research was to determine if 
Microsoft’s Band 2 was designed and developed using a known framework, industry guidelines, 
and adhered to best practices to prevent or reduce a MITMA and limit the capture of traffic. 
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Latest/Newest Wearable Technology Devices 
Wearable technology has grown immensely, including the 2.2 billion dollars of wearable 
technology devices or 48+ million devices sold, causing one in five households to have a fitness 
tracker in 2016, according to the data release at the 2017 Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in 
Las Vegas January 9th-12th, 2017. According to the CES vendors and manufacturers, there were 
a wide variety of new products introduced to the marketplace in 2017. Some of these new 
product items included smart clothing, smart watches, fitness trackers, medical devices, and even 
items in the automotive industry developed to add health monitoring/tracking capabilities to 
vehicles [3]. Some of the CES products showcased at the event were: 
• smart clothing by Polar 
o Polar Team Pro can track heart rate and body temperature, to name a few 
smart functions [3]. 
• Smart Bed by Sleep Number 
o This bed tracks movement and adjusts if the bed detects snoring; it even can 
warm the sleeper’s feet [3]. 
• smart earbuds by Bodytrak 
o These earbuds can measure heart rate and body temperature; these can be used 
for anyone from a hospital patient to an elite athlete. The data are sent 
wirelessly to one’s device [3]. 
• smart oral care by Kolibree 
o Ara Smart is an artificial intelligence (AI) embedded device that connects to 
an application on a smartphone via Bluetooth [3]. 
• TomTom Sport 
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o TomTom has even entered the fitness tracking arena with TomTom Sport [3]. 
• RunIQ 
o New Balance developed a smartwatch called RunIQ [3]. 
• PillDrill Hub by PillDrill 
o This is a device that reminds patients to take their medication and sends a 
notification to predefined individuals, which could include medical staff, 
doctor office, or family members [3]. 
• Diabnext 
o This is an AI application to monitor and track insulin doses and connect the 
patient with the doctor or medical staff [3]. 
• smart spoon and fork by Gyenno Technologies 
o This is an application for patients with Parkinson’s or other diseases who 
exhibit unsteadiness to collect data about patient tremors or other symptoms 
and send the information to the medical or research staff [3]. 
These items are just a few examples. Devices continue to gain popularity and are developed for a 
multitude of uses as the technology continues to advance. 
IoT Technology Security 
 This section reviews previous research focused on IoT device security and some of the 
threats and risk introduced when using this wearable technology. 
Wearable Technology Security 
Wearable technology is a broad, generic category describing a range of devices, including 
fitness trackers such as the Microsoft Band 2, Fitbit, or the Vivoactive by Garmin. Also included 
are smartwatches, smart glasses, smart gloves for golfers, mobile police cameras, and remote 
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patient monitoring devices. Each device has unique individual vulnerabilities and common 
security risks. The typical security risks are a result of the Bluetooth technology used by all these 
wearable devices to connect and provide information to various other devices. 
Wearable technology is a growing industry; it is emerging as a crucial player in the IoT. 
As more consumers use wearable technology, threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks on these 
devices increase. A process or a method of mitigation techniques for the current weaknesses is 
crucial to the continued safe use of Bluetooth technology for these devices. 
Also of importance are private and public sector policies that govern the use of these 
devices. An article in Government Finance Review studied 2015 technology trends. The author 
described the policy implications of using these devices. According to Rogue, “Managers should 
monitor and update any policies that are affected by the use of wearable devices, and such 
policies may need to be incorporated into employee contracts” [4] to protect the organizational 
infrastructure. 
A Utica College study described wearable technology as “an upward trending 
technology, which provides benefits to many different industries such as police, military, health 
care, and first responders” [5]. They found that because of the security risks, wearable 
technology could be used for information gathering in either the public or private sector. Because 
of this, policies and procedures are needed to reduce the risk to organizations that allow wearable 
technology into their organizational environment [5]. 
The security of applications that support the functionality of wearable devices is also of 
high concern. A cooperative of four universities studied the security of mobile applications and 
the increasing number of attacks and viruses directed at mobile computing. To this end, “In 
2013, Sophos2 concluded that Android is the biggest target, and F-secure3 reported that the 
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number of mobile malware samples grew from several hundred to more than 50,000 in just two 
years” [6]. As more consumers acquire wearable devices, this number is projected to increase. 
With an ever-increasing number of attacks on wearable devices, personally identifiable 
information (PII) and other sensitive data are at risk. According to King, Chu, and Mellinger, 
“The ubiquitous and popular use of mobile devices has made mobile application security a 
pressing issue. Because these devices contain large amounts of sensitive personal information, 
they are attractive targets for attackers seeking financial gain” [7]. Bring your own device 
(BTOD) programs increase these security concerns. 
Data generated by wearable devices is also on the rise. The researcher found that in 
“2014, global mobile data traffic reached 2.5 exabytes (2.5 billion gigabytes) per month” [8]. 
Additionally, “the world’s 100 million or so wearable devices were generating 15 million 
gigabytes of monthly traffic,” and wearable technology data are “expected to increase fivefold by 
2019” [8]. According to Austen, “Surveys show that users worry about how these devices invade 
their privacy” [8]. There is also an anticipated increase in wearable technology usage within the 
medical industry. Because of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requirements, 
information privacy is of the utmost concern [8]. 
The University of Strathclyde studied data storage and information security of four 
popular wearable technology vendors. They compared user policies and procedures meant to 
protect and secure data and found that user agreements reviewed had not been updated in a few 
years, and provided conflicting and confusing statements [9]. Both Fitbit and Nike+ user 
agreements state that the company complies with the Safe Harbor agreement, which describes 
safe data transference between countries. The user agreements for Fitbit, Jawbone, Nike+, and 
Basis were reviewed to determine which offered better protection. They noted, “all four services 
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studied stated that user data would be stored outwith [sic] the European Union (which has 
specific and often stronger protections for private user data)” [9]. Since these devices collect 
health data, it could be viewed as problematic that “electronic health records created from health 
apps operate largely outside of the traditional legal framework” [10]. According to Creasy and 
Knoespel, “Unless a health app involves a covered entity or business associate, HIPAA does not 
apply” [10]. In the United States, this is expected protection of health data that may not be in 
place. 
George Washington University researchers analyzed the data output from various 
sources, including wearable devices, mobile applications, and various social media outlets. Their 
intent was to determine if pooling the data from these different sources allowed one to be able to 
acquire personal and sensitive data. Once data were compiled, researchers attempted to track 
and/or predict where a person was or would be located. Researchers were able to gather 
information from wearable devices that allowed them to be able to infer a person’s behavior [11]. 
Wearable devices are capable of functions beyond their factory program via malware, 
inappropriate access, and further addition of programming. Each of these alters the initial intent 
of wearable devices. Factory programming allows the BTLE-enabled wearable devices to receive 
and display text messages, calendar alerts, and email message notifications. In an attempt to 
determine if it is possible for a student to use this type of device to cheat, researchers at the 
University of Michigan developed a prototype application that allowed students to collaborate 
with other students during a multiple-choice exam. 
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 The application allowed cloud-based interaction and was successful. Once tested, researchers 
provided mitigation to prevent this type of event [12]. 
 Commercial and open source tools are available to determine the security profile of a 
device. Some scan the device for weaknesses in the hardware, firmware, software, or protocols. 
Others intercept transmitted data packets and analyze them for security issues, such as a clear 
text password or data injection. Some researchers have developed tools for specific security 
issues related to their project. The University of Nebraska at Omaha, with the help of the 
University of Tulsa, developed a toolkit called Secu Wear that allows the user to conduct 
research on wearable devices. Secu Wear was developed using open source standards and can 
quickly and easy create prototypes to test hardware and software and to evaluate the security 
posture of wearable devices. Secu Wear allows the user to identify threats and implement 
mitigation [13]. 
The AV-TEST Institute, an independent IT security institute, compared nine popular 
fitness tracking devices. They evaluated the overall performance of these devices, including 
“questions concerning the security of data storage and transmission, either via Bluetooth or the 
Internet, authentication on application and tracker and overall security flaws” [14]. Figure 1 
shows the findings related to Bluetooth security [14]. The results are wide-ranging. 
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Figure 1 Wearable device comparison chart. 
Fitbit Devices 
Fitbit is a wearable fitness tracking device similar to the Microsoft Band 2. Since 
Microsoft’s Band 2 is a newer product with limited research, a review of the literature on this 
precursor device is indicated. Much research has been performed on this technology. The 
University of Florida explored the security, privacy, and generic vulnerabilities of several 
wearable devices specifically focused on the integrity of personal health data. Researchers 
described specific weaknesses with the Fitbit, including the use of clear text passwords, a lack of 
authentication, and susceptibility to data injection. These researchers developed a new protocol, 
called FitLock, to mitigate these threats [15]. 
Florida International University conducted similar research into the vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses of the Fitbit and, as a result, developed a hacking tool named Fitbite, which allowed 
them to eavesdrop, inject data, and create denial of service (DOS) attacks on Fitbit devices. Once 
researchers exploited the Fitbit via Fitbit, they proceeded to develop a tool called FitLock—a 
15 
completely different application than what was developed by the University of Florida. Their 
design provided secure storage using a simple process to protect and provide better security to 
Fitbit users [15]. This research was extended to test FitLock on a variety of wearable technology 
weaknesses to determine if FitLock would provide a solution to security issues within the 
wearable technology industry [16]. Researchers “analyzed the various attack scenarios and also 
proposed various types of possible defenses against them. We believe that our proposed attack 
methodology and defenses may be applicable to several wearable and implantable healthcare 
systems” [16]. 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology performed a security assessment of the Fitbit 
device with the objective of analyzing user and device data, as well as specific types of attacks. 
They analyzed captured data sent between the Fitbit and Fitbit applications, along with the data 
between the Fitbit and Fitbit web services, to discover security or privacy issues. Also analyzed 
was the authentication process to determine if a MITMA could be successful and if passkeys 
were sent in clear text. The findings revealed that Fitbit does not implement the private address 
changing standard, reducing security during Bluetooth usage. Fitbit does, however, encrypt key 
exchange using non-Bluetooth low-energy (BTLE) standards, which prevented researchers from 
cracking the key. 
IoT Devices Within Transport and Medical Industries 
 This researcher conducted other research projects looking at various industries’ use of 
IoT devices. Other industries that are incorporating IoT devices include cloud, medical, physical 
security, and transportation. Each of these industries has unique risks and threats associated with 
the various IoT devices being deployed in the given environment. These risks and threats are 
discussed in 67. One example of IoT devices used within the transportation industry is 
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“Researchers from Mokpo National University conducted research with Raspberry Pi in the 
container transportation industry to track and monitor container shipments. Raspberry Pi sent 
either an email or short message service (SMS) alert that allowed for up-to-the-moment shipment 
information. This application: 
increase[d] the security and productivity of the supply chain” [17]. This became a useful 
application for Raspberry Pi within the IoT. Use of Raspberry Pi in the trucking industry 
allows the driver to update dispatch regarding location and load status via pre-
programmed tweets within Raspberry Pi 18]. If a security risk in Raspberry Pi exists, a 
hacker could disrupt transportation of products or services. [19] 
An example of IoT devices used within the medical industry is: 
Researchers from Delhi Technological University developed a Raspberry Pi protocol for 
the medical industry [20]. The prototype was a body sensor to monitor elderly patients 
for falls that processed and transmitted data to a central monitoring station. The “body 
sensor module will be extremely beneficial to the patients and their caregivers who will 
be able to monitor their health on their own. It will enable doctors and physicians to 
remotely monitor” these patients as well [19 and 20]. 
Bluetooth Threats/Risks 
 This section reviews previous research focused on Bluetooth security and some of the 
threats and risks that are introduced when using this technology. 
Bluetooth Security 
 The University of Bergen, Norway analyzed the 802.15.6 IEEE standard related to body 
area networks. This research determined if a weakness within the master key could be used to 
gain access to a Bluetooth device. This technology is based on four protocols that use four 
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elliptic-curve cryptography to generate a master key. Using various attacks, it was determined 
that this weakness posed a significant security risk to Bluetooth devices [21]. 
Bell Labs analyzed three particular threats that targeted Bluetooth devices. First, they 
monitored the critical exchange between two devices and found an issue that would allow an 
attacker to conduct a MITMA. Second, a vulnerability was analyzed that allowed an attacker to 
determine the specific location of the Bluetooth device, allowing the device to be tracked without 
user consent. Last, researchers studied cipher attacks in Bluetooth devices. This allowed 
attackers an uninhibited view of device data. Researchers found solutions to these three threats 
that could be easily implemented in a Bluetooth device to prevent attacks and improve the 
overall security of the device [22]. 
 Florida Atlantic University conducted research on Bluetooth security in wearable 
computing applications. Bluetooth vulnerabilities were revealed. Subsequently, best practices 
and countermeasures for these threats were successfully implemented [23]. A basis for working 
with Bluetooth security risks was provided. 
 Research at Helsinki University of Technology provided an overview of Bluetooth 
technology and discussed how Bluetooth security was used in both distributed and ad hoc 
environments. Bluetooth authentication, encryption, and key management were described as vital 
elements of Bluetooth security. Issues in these areas resulted in a lack of security, so particular 
attention must be paid to these areas as well [24]. 
Bluetooth Fuzzing 
Fuzzing is: 
A highly automated testing technique that covers numerous boundary cases using invalid 
data (from files, network protocols, API calls, and other targets) as application input to 
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ensure the absence of exploitable vulnerabilities better. The name comes from modem 
applications’ tendency to fail due to random input caused by line noise on “fuzzy” 
telephone lines. [25] 
Fuzzing for Software Security Testing and Quality Assurance details the uses for, benefits of, and 
requirements for using fuzz testing in security and quality assurance testing as well as the history 
behind fuzzing, a general overview, the types of vulnerabilities that can be discovered, and 
different types of fuzzing tools. The book details fuzzing software, network protocols (including 
Bluetooth), and how this type of testing can be used to increase the quality assurance of 
applications and products that incorporate fuzz testing in the development and manufacturing 
process [25]. 
 The University of Auckland conducted a study that analyzed public opinion regarding 
Bluetooth security. The results showed females used Bluetooth technology more securely than 
males, and that females were more concerned about privacy and security while using Bluetooth. 
Even though this study did not analyze Bluetooth security or fuzz testing of threats and 
weaknesses within Bluetooth, it offered remarkable insight into how the public viewed Bluetooth 
security and privacy. The need for end-user privacy training and security awareness training to 
help increase user privacy and security while using Bluetooth devices continues to be vital [26]. 
The University of Washington analyzed Bluetooth protocol vulnerabilities and the effects 
of a DOS attack on mobile devices. Tests were conducted with the six most popular mobile 
phones. One testing tool used was a type of fuzzing tool called the Bluetooth Stack Smasher 
(BSS). All phones were tested for a known issue that should have been mitigated, and one of the 
six phones was still affected by the known threat. In addition to Bluetooth fuzzing, a wide range 
of tools and software applications were used to discover weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The 
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analysis showed that (a) DOS attacks could disrupt mobile device usage and (b) users could be 
traced or tracked from the Bluetooth data [27]. 
Research at Onsei University and Sookmyung Women’s University analyzed 
vulnerabilities in the Android application. A new process was created to use a component-level 
validation process to limit and prevent Java vulnerabilities in the operation of mobile devices. 
The researchers used two types of peer-reviewed fuzz testing to detect and correct vulnerabilities 
during the testing process: random data and a semi-valid check [28]. 
 Pune Institute of Computer Technology looked at smartphone protocol and application 
vulnerabilities. They created three groups of attacks; malware, spyware, and grayware [29]; 
along with Bluetooth and SMS attacks. Fuzz testing helped detect vulnerabilities. 
Countermeasures to mitigate vulnerabilities to the smartphone were discussed [28]. 
Guru Nanak Khalsa Institute of Technology and Management Studies and Technical 
Institute of Advanced Studies analyzed the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in Bluetooth 
technology. General information on Bluetooth transmission was included in the discussion. In 
the analysis of the security functions, Bluetooth weaknesses and threats were discussed, as well 
as how fuzzing could be used to attack a Bluetooth device. Tips to increase Bluetooth device 
security are provided. As with most security tools, they are dual-pronged, in that they can be 
used to increase security and discover threats/weaknesses. The same tools can also be used to 
break into and exploit the security vulnerabilities of these devices. It depends on who is using the 
tool and for what purpose the tool is being used [30]. 
Industry experts performed research to develop new tools to detect Bluetooth 
vulnerabilities in mobile devices. They believed the current off-the-shelf (OTS) tools were not 
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suited for use in the mobile environment. A new robust and useful tool was introduced to the 
security committee at DEF CON 2009 [31]. 
The National Institute of Technology Rourkela reviewed various attacks that could occur 
within the Bluetooth environment. One type of test analyzed was fuzzing. Various fuzzing tools 
were reviewed, including BluePass, BSS, BlueSmack, BlueStub, and Tanya. Any of these tools 
could be used for either white hats or black hats, depending on the use and purpose the user of 
these tools intended. This research also reviewed a wide variety of other security tools to detect 
vulnerabilities within the Bluetooth environment and protocol [32]. 
The University of Science and Technology Chittagong, Bangladesh investigated the 
effects of the most popular Bluetooth attacks to discover the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of 
Bluetooth devices. Some of the attacks analyzed were surveillance, obfuscation, sniffing, 
unauthorized direct data access, and MITMA [33]. This research used two fuzzing tools—BSS 
and BlueSmack. BSS sends data packets to a specific Bluetooth device, whereas BlueSmack was 
designed to provide a “non-standard size of echo message response packet just like an ICMP 
ping” [33]. The analysis found that using fuzzing techniques to analyze Bluetooth vulnerabilities 
was not a benefit and not a useful method to test for weaknesses. The research determined that 
one method to increase Bluetooth security was to allow the user to accept or reject Bluetooth 
connections to specific devices [33] 
Johns Hopkins University and the University of Michigan reviewed numerous peer-
reviewed articles on privacy and security of medical and health care Bluetooth devices and 
protocols to gain a better understanding of the Bluetooth vulnerabilities and determine increasing 
threats. This information was used to attempt to reduce the overall security risk to these devices 
and increase privacy and security when using medical devices. They found that software 
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application and sensors were not heavily researched, and this was an area where security and 
privacy research should be conducted. Researchers discovered that standard tools for detecting 
vulnerabilities, such as Peach Fuzzer, are not designed to detect weaknesses within the health 
care industry [34]. 
Vrije University analyzed RFID attacks, malware tools, and security. One of the tools 
used for RFID security testing is fuzzing. Fuzz testing of the RFID middleware was conducted to 
determine how the middleware would respond to the various malware attacks and to verify what 
security vulnerabilities existed. The research offered a great deal of information regarding 
vulnerabilities and threats within this type of environment along with insight into fuzzing and the 
benefits of using this type of testing [35]. 
As part of a committee-funded grant, Softeam Research and Development Division 
worked on a project to discover problems in planning and designing cyber-physical systems 
(CPS). One of the processes for CPS was to validate and certify that the system met minimal 
standards. Another process to validate and certify CPS was to perform three types of fuzzing 
tests on the system—data fuzzing, behavior fuzzing, and model-based fuzzing. These fuzzing 
tests ensured the system maintained a specific level of privacy and security [36]. 
Surya Engineering College analyzed an open source malware detection tool known as 
ALTERDROID. This tool used “reverse engineering, obfuscated functionality in components 
distributed as parts of an app package” [37] to detect and discover malware within Android 
applications. The basic idea behind ALTERDROID was that the application compared “the 
original app and an altered version” to determine what modifications were present and if 
malware was introduced as part of the modification. This tool was designed to evaluate the actual 
code for missing or hidden components that could damage or reduce the operation of Android 
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devices. They reviewed statistics for smartphone purchases, usage, developed applications, and 
malware within the Android platform. Researchers analyzed how malware functioned in the 
various layers, functions, and features of smartphones. The malware was classified into three 
groups, as in other peer-reviewed papers, but they also described the topic method to place the 
malware on the smartphones. Bluetooth malware and the privacy and security concerns that 
malware can cause were also assessed. Of note was a need for various types of tests on the code, 
specifically fault injection and robustness test, which includes fuzzing [37]. 
The University of Madrid analyzed various malware that affected smartphones and how 
malware transformed as new technology is being developed. One of the vulnerabilities discussed 
was the exploits within SMS and SMS fuzzing also discussed at Blackhat USA 2009. The 
research described DriodMOSS, a fuzzing technique based on detecting repackaged applications 
using hashing functions. This research was able to detect 20 of the most popular forms of 
malware used on smartphones. These researchers reviewed how malware and other 
vulnerabilities affected smartphones and were able to chart their results [38]. 
End-User Security Behavior 
This section reviews previous research focused on end users and consumer perceptions 
and views of Bluetooth security and the risks of using this technology. 
End-User Bluetooth Security Awareness 
 One must also consider the human side of Bluetooth security and not just the technology. 
To ensure proper security of any asset, one needs to be fully aware of both in addition to the 
policies that affect the use of these devices. To this end, two researchers at Nanyang 
Technological University measured students’ knowledge and awareness of Bluetooth security. 
Also analyzed was the students’ perceptions of Bluetooth security threats and whether the 
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students had the ability to implement proper safety measures [39]. The study found, “most 
undergraduate university students who participated in the study are regular users of Bluetooth” 
and, “these users are not taking precautions to mitigate the possible harm that ‘re-engineered’ 
Bluetooth can expose them to” [39]. 
A research project at the University of Alabama in Huntsville measured user behavior 
toward Bluetooth security before and after Bluetooth security awareness training. This training 
was based on known vulnerabilities. Findings indicated users had a better Bluetooth security 
posture after receiving the training [40]. 
Mitigation Methods 
This section reviews previous research that focuses on nontraditional methods used to 
mitigate security threats and risks. 
Alternative Mitigation Methods 
 The issues discussed in 11 and 24 were further analyzed by the Nokia Research Center to 
develop more secure solutions to mitigate these vulnerabilities. One solution provided was to use 
public key encryption for key exchange. Creation of a temporary device address was a further 
solution since this would provide security against location tracking and discovery of Bluetooth 
device ID [41]. 
 IBM discovered an alternative method for solving various security issues, to reduce 
cybercrime, and to increase the overall security of the Internet and computing. Barlow of IBM 
suggested cybersecurity could be improved using the same concepts used to fight pandemics or 
other healthcare crises—using crisis management, openly sharing data, and providing up-to-date 
information in a timely fashion. Information needs to include the number of victims, how the 
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virus is spreading, and at what rate is the spread occurring for the fight and cure to be effective 
[42]. 
 Barlow and his team have researched this approach to combat cybercrime and 
cybersecurity. They viewed the spread of a computer virus the same as that of a human virus and 
analyzed the benefits of using the healthcare steps and governmental approach to thwart 
pandemics or other healthcare crises against cybercrime to reduce cybercrime and increase user 
safety and security. Barlow openly shared his vulnerability database with the public. By taking 
this approach, he believed once the vulnerabilities and threats are known, everyone would be 
able to take the proper steps toward mitigating these threats and hardening their systems to 
prevent or reduce the risk of infection. [42] 
 The potential benefit in this approach and exposure of known viruses and vulnerabilities 
to the public is clear. A benefit to this method is that it allows the public and others information 
on known threats and how to mitigate or limit the damage from them. A significant drawback is 
that once these threats are known, malicious actors could use these threats against individuals 
and devices, which could be damaging to organizations that did not have the opportunity or 
resources needed to take the proper actions against these threats. In general, it is a good concept, 
but it may not be practical for implementation because of malicious actors. 
Standards 
This section reviews previous research that focuses on security-related issues from a 
standard perspective. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 Vital for the security of any Bluetooth device is a review of the Bluetooth security 
standards. The NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-121 Revision 1 Guide to Bluetooth Security 
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provides an overview of Bluetooth technology and discusses security features. Also included are 
vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures for Bluetooth technology [43]. Although this NIST 
document helps eliminate some of the existing Bluetooth issues, NIST notes that device security 
is continually changing due to new technology and threat creation. 
FDA Security Framework 
 The FDA has noted the increased risk of newer medical devices can be espoused 
concerning when wearable technology devices operate within the IoT environment. Because of 
this, the FDA created a new framework for post-market medical devices to increase security, 
prevent or reduce exploitation, and provide steps to mitigate issues and harden medical devices. 
This framework was designed to increase patient safety and increase the reliability and 
dependability of medical devices and applies to a wide range of medical devices, including 
hardware, firmware, and software. The one medical device category this framework does not 
cover is investigational devices. Developed using industry standards, guidelines, best practices, 
and other frameworks, this framework was created to promote open and shareable information 
and data with the public and private organizations in a secure manner to improve the security of 
medical devices and develop better medical products. [44] 
 The FDA framework was built upon other documents from Executive Order 13636—
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which led to the NIST document “Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Version 1.0,” dated February 12th, 2014. 
Other policies that helped shape this framework included the Presidential Policy Directive 21—
“Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience” (PPD-21), the “Content of Premarket 
Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices,” and “Cybersecurity for 
Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf (OTS) Software Guidelines.” The purpose 
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of this framework is for vendors, manufacturers, IT companies, and medical device organizations 
to take proactive measures against cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that minimize risks 
by implementing security controls and mitigation measures to increase the safety and security for 
patients and users [45].  
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CHAPTER 3. COMPILING IoT SECURITY STANDARDS 
 This chapter discusses the standards and framework selected for review and analysis in 
the development of RIOTSS. This project includes both older and newer standards and 
frameworks, based on a review of the literature, with over 30 highlighted specifically for the 
RIOTSS project. 
Commonly Known Security Standards 
 Some of the standards initially earmarked for inclusion in this research are well known as 
industry-leading best practices, in particular, ETSI, IEEE, ISO, NIST, and OWASP. These 
organizations built their membership of individuals with a wide range of diverse knowledge, 
experience, and skills, and incorporated these when they developed their standards. They were 
included for review to determine if a standard or framework existed to meet the specific security 
requirements and concerns of IoT devices. 
Unfamiliar Security Standards and Frameworks 
 Some of the standards reviewed and analyzed for this dissertation were unfamiliar until 
discovered during this research project, including AIOTI, AllSeen Alliance, Online Trust 
Alliance, the Open Management Group, and Thread Group. These lesser-known standards and 
frameworks were selected for review because they were explicitly created for IoT. Since these 
organizations claimed to be applicable to IoT and other smart devices, a review was needed to 
ensure that these standards and frameworks were genuinely designed for these devices—in 
particular, the specific security requirements and concerns of IoT devices. 
 Table 1 shows a list of standards and frameworks considered in the dissertation because 
they are directly or indirectly related to IoT devices, a brief description of the organization, the 
organizational type, and the accessibility of their work. 
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Table 1 List of the Organization that Developed an IoT Standard / Frameworks 
Organization Description Type Availability 
AIOTI The “Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation (AIOTI) was launched by the 
European Commission to support the development of a European IoT ecosystem, 





AllSeen Alliance “AllSeen Alliance promotes widespread adoption of an interoperable peer 





The “IoT Workgroup extends and builds on the spec from International 
Telecommunication Union- Telecommunication (ITU-T)Y.2060 and looks at the 
aspects interfacing between cloud-based systems and edge devices covered in ITU 
and other standards” [6] 
P DL 
ETSI ETSI works toward “developing standards for data security, data management, data 
transport and data processing related to potentially connecting billions of smart 





IEEE has a “dedicated IoT initiative and [is a] clearinghouse of information for the 




IERC “The European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things coordinates ongoing 






“The Internet’s premier standards-setting body has an IoT Directorate that is 
coordinating related efforts across its working groups, reviewing specifications for 
consistency, and monitoring IoT-related activities in other standards groups.” 
https://www.ietf.org/about/who/ 
P E 
IIC “Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) has teamed up with the OIC to accelerate the 






“IGF sponsors the Dynamic Coalition on IoT, which hosts open meetings to discuss 
global challenges that need to be addressed regarding IoT deployment.” 
https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/tags/about 
G E 
IoT Consortium IoT Consortium “provides consumer research and market education aimed at driving 






IoTSF is “A group purely dedicated to building standards for IoT Security” [47] 
NP DL 
Internet protocol 
for smart objects 
(IPSO) Alliance 
IPSO Alliance is “Dedicated to enabling IoT, IPSO seeks to establish IP as the basis 





“ISO issued a preliminary report on IoT in 2014 as well as a Smart Cities report. The 
group has ongoing subcommittees in both areas.” 
https://www.iso.org/committee/45306.html 
P E 
ISOC’s Internet of 
Food SIG 
“This special interest group leads a discussion on the technical infrastructure 
standards needed for the food industry in the future.” 
https://www.internetsociety.org/sigs 
P N/A 
MAPI Foundation “The Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (MAPI) is developing 
Industry 4.0 for industrial applications of IoT.” 
https://mapifoundation.org/what-we-do/ 
P E 
OASIS “OASIS has three technical committees in IoT overseeing Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and two other standards, advanced message queuing 






The open interconnection consortium is a “common communication framework 
based on industry standards to wirelessly connect and manage the flow of 
information among IoT devices. It sponsors the IoTivity Project, an open-source 






“This technical standards consortium is developing several IoT standards, including 
data distribution service and interaction flow modeling language along with 
dependability frameworks, threat modeling, and a unified component model for real-





Table 1. (continued) 




“OWASP sponsors an IoT Top Ten Project, which is designed to help 
manufacturers, developers, and consumers understand related security issues with its 





“SGIP has an effort called Energy IoT focused on new opportunities for IoT within 
the energy industry. The group’s is a utility-led project that is incorporating common 
utility data models and IoT communication p Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB) 






Securing Smart Cities is a global not-for-profit initiative that aims to solve the 
existing and future 
cybersecurity problems of smart cities through collaboration between companies, 
governments, media outlets, other not-for-profit.” 
https://securingsmartcities.org/ 
NP E 
UL2900 “Underwriter’s Laboratories Cybersecurity Assurance Program (CAP) brings peace 
of mind. CAP certification verifies that a product offers a reasonable level of 
protection against threats that may result in unintended or unauthorized access, 
change or disruption.” 
https://www.ul.com/aboutul/ 
P E 
Note. Type: government (G), open source (OS), proprietary (P), non-profit (NP). Availability: not yet developed (N/A), for download (DL), 
Emailed (E). 
Security Standards Not Included 
 During the compilation of these security standards and frameworks, access to proprietary 
works was of issue and had not previously been considered as an obstacle for the successful 
completion of the RIOTSS project. Even though many of the organizations listed above are non-
profit, the organizational standards and frameworks are considered proprietary information that 
some do not want to share or freely distribute. Via an email request for a copy of their works, the 
use of their standards was explained, and some were willing to share their organizational 
standards or frameworks. Some commonly known organizations; such as IEEE, ISO, and UL; 
did not have their works easily accessible or were not willing to provide them freely for 
university research purposes. Some would not even sell a copy of their works, stating that their 
standard/framework was either proprietary or a work-in-progress and only for company use. 
 This research project compiled close to half of the overall total security standards and 
was completed considering these, particularly because these were the most accessible for 
research and, presumably, use. If an organization had provided a copy of the requested standard 
or framework prior to the completion of the research portion of this project, it would also have 
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been included. The security standards compiled were enough to visualize a pattern of security 
measures implemented and where overlap occurred. Weaknesses and gaps within the various 
standards could also be located. 
 Table 2 lists organizations emailed with a research request for their standard/framework 
for IoT devices since no easy method for accessing their standard/frameworks for review and 
analysis was found. The table also includes the status on the organizational reply to this request. 
Table 2 Replies from Requested Copy of Related Organizational Works 
Organization 
Standard/Framework 
Email response Provided? 
AIOTI We do not have or perform any device or security certification. We are an association discussing 
policies and research related to IoT 
No 
AllSeen Alliance No response to the email request  No 
ETSI Please find below a link to all the Technical Specifications and Technical Reports that have been 





No response to the email request No 




No response to the email request No 
IIC No response to the email request No 
Internet Governance 
Forum 
No response to the email request No 
IoT Consortium No response to the email request No 
IPSO Alliance No response to the email request No 
ISO/IECJTC-1/SC 27 Unfortunately, the ISO Central Secretariat does not provide free copies. Also, these are ongoing 
projects, and we don’t distribute working documents outside the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC)  
No 
MAPI Foundation Please find below a link to all the Technical Specifications and Technical Reports that have been 
prepared by oneM2M. If you need any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
http://www.onem2m.org/technical/latest-drafts  
Linked 
oneM2M None at this time—As of 30August 30, ppend have not received any response from my No 
Online Trust Alliance No response to the email request No 
Open Interconnection 
Consortium 
You may be interested in reading the OCF Core and Security specifications, as well as looking 
through the OCF 1.3 Specification Introduction and Overview slide deck. Those materials will give 








All resources for the OWASP IoT Project are available at our website; we do not maintain hardcopies 
or other resources outside what you can find there. For the IoT Project, please visit 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project. 
No 
Thread Group No response to the email request No 
W3C Web of Things 
(WoT) 
No response to the email request No 
Securing Smart Cities Thanks for contacting. We don’t use any standard/framework to analyze devices or analyze risk; most 
security researchers use their experience and skills for such works. Standards could only provide a 
baseline on where and what to look for but most important is knowledge (experience and skills) if you 
don’t have the knowledge then the standards aren’t helpful 
No 
UL2900 Replied via voice mail stating they are not able to provide a free copy of their standard, but they are 




Compilation of Security Standards—Logic 
 The main reason for compiling a multitude of differing security standards and 
frameworks was to determine if one or more addressed the special security issues associated with 
IoT devices and located gaps that might not adequately address the specific security 
requirements of IoT devices. Particular areas this project addressed using these standards and 
frameworks included determining whether devices were using or adhering to frameworks or 
standards to increase security and whether they were ensuring a hardened device developed. 
Methods to increase security in IoT devices are included in Table 3. 
Table 3 Components and Methods to Increase Security for IoT Devices [46] 
Components and Methods to Increase Security for IoT Devices 
The use of secure programming 
The use of: 
• hardware security modules (HSMs) and 
• trusted platform modules. 
The use of security technical implementation 
guidelines (STIG) 
The use of a microcontroller (MCU) and enabling 
memory protection units on the MCU 
The use of a secure OS The MCU uses specialized security chips 
The use of encryption 
Incorporates tamper protection and secure physical 
interfaces, in additional to secure bootstraps 
The use of opt-in for any information gathering/sharing 
Incorporates the use of secure supply and only use 
approved products from authorized partners 
The use of secure web and web interfaces 
Conducts self-test to verify all known vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses are hardened, pass along the supply 
chain 
The ability to patch and update devices and firmware 
Ensures the protocols used are hardened and using the 
highest security standards 
The ability to use multi-factor authentication and/or 
Biometrics 
Ensures vendor and supply chain partners are 
conducting audits both by internal and external groups 
The use of certificates and or the ability to use certificateless authenticated encryption (CLAE) 
 
With all security standards and frameworks for review and analysis successfully 
downloaded, the project moved on to a comparison and analysis of each. In comparing and 
analyzing these, it was essential to have a standard for use as a basis to build from, and for 
RIOTSS, the starting point was NIST 800-53. 
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Chapter Contribution Summary 
 The purpose of this section is to highlight and briefly discuss how this chapter was able to 
validate the thesis statement, support the project objectives, and prove that this RIOTSS project 
offers a contribution to the research community. Within this chapter, review of the standards and 
frameworks in RIOTSS supported thesis statement two. Thesis statement three was validated 
through the use of industry standards and IT security best practices for mitigation methods for 
the security gaps and weakness that were discovered. 
 Within this chapter, all objectives were met through review of the various standards and 
frameworks considered for incorporation into RIOTSS. These were further met through the 
discussion of RIOTSS as a single source to assess IoT devices and mitigate findings using these 
practices. Along with the review of the various standards and frameworks to ensure data 
encryption, network security was implemented through continued review and use of the latest 
standards. Since this chapter delved into the various standards and frameworks prior to the 
development of the RIOTSS framework, it was not able to support contributions one through 
three. These contributions are shown in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4. BUILDING RIOTSS FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter discusses how RIOTSS was created and developed and plans to synthesize 
the various frameworks and standards described previously. Gaps and weaknesses within these 
standards are not discussed here; a discussion of how RIOTSS originated is the primary focus. 
The starting point for RIOTSS was NIST 800-53rev4 (NIST). As a starting point, NIST provided 
a solid foundation for expansion. NIST 800-53 is a very well-known standard used by various 
industries and organizations. 
Framework and Standard Terminology 
 In building a foundation for RIOTSS, defining and recognizing the difference between a 
standard and a framework were important. These terms were heavily used throughout this 
research project so defining the differences is helpful: 
a) a standard is “document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, 
that provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a 
given context. Note: Standards should be based on the consolidated results of science, 
technology, and experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits. 
Source(s): [49] and 
b) a framework is a “Cybersecurity Framework developed for defining protection of critical 
infrastructure. It provides a common language for understanding, managing, and 
expressing cybersecurity risk both internally and externally. Includes activities to achieve 
specific cybersecurity outcomes, and references examples of guidance to achieve those 
outcomes” [50]. 
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Researcher from KULeuven University Heverlee defined “IoT framework entails identifying a 
structure which coordinates and controls processes being conducted by the various IoT elements. 
This structure is a set of rules, protocols and regulations that organize the way of processing data 
and exchange messages between all involved parties (e.g. embedded devices, cloud, end-users)” 
[51]. 
 Based on this, RIOTSS falls within the definition of a framework, since it is a 
fundamental concept that offers general objectives and methods to mitigate threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
RIOTSS Threat Space 
 Threats and vulnerabilities within the IoT structure are known as the IoT threat space; 
understanding the IoT threat space helped ensure RIOTSS would address distinctive security 
issues for IoT devices. The following items encompass the IoT threat space that RIOTSS 
addressed: 
• use of hard-coded username/password or weak password, 
• use of weak encryption standards, and 
• use of weak Bluetooth standards. 
Hard-coded and weak passwords allowed easy compromise of IoT devices, providing 
unauthorized device access. A hard-coded username also allowed easy device access, since an 
unauthorized user is provided half of the device login information. All that is needed is the 
password, and if the password is weak and/or hard-coded, it makes access that much easier. 
IoT devices with weak or older encryption or Bluetooth standards would not properly 
secure or adequately protect the system or user data. If weak or older encryption was used, 
unencryption would be easier, and the device would be subject to a MITMA. Additionally, weak 
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or older Bluetooth standards use hard-coded or short passcodes that allow for data capture and 
vulnerability to a MITMA. RIOTSS incorporated controls to address IoT threat space issues. 
RIOTSS Foundation 
RIOTSS was developed using NIST 800-53 and five other freely available standards and 
frameworks in the public domain. NIST offered a well-organized, mature standard to initiate the 
RIOTSS framework. As a starting point to build RIOTSS, NIST 800-53 allowed flexibility and 
adaptability for the target industries. 
To this end, a decision about which categories to incorporate and which to leave out of 
phase one of RIOTSS had to be made. Those left out of the first phase included items such as 
business security processes and responsibility, business continuity, physical security, secure 
supply chain, and insider threat. These categories were incorporated in phase two of RIOTSS, 
discussed in the future work section of Chapter 8. 
 RIOTSS was developed using six rounds of review, comparing various open standards 
and frameworks. Standards and frameworks considered for inclusion are discussed in detail in a 
later chapter. The exclusion parameters were based on the category’s direct or indirect effect on 
the IoT device security; if a category indirectly affected security, then it was excluded. In the 
first round, categories were removed to make RIOTSS streamlined for an effective framework 
foundation. 
Rounds two through six included a process of repeated review and analysis of various 
open standards and frameworks listed in a later chapter. A gap analysis was used to determine 
which items to include based on an improved security posture, based on which standards and 
frameworks filled gaps and hardened weaknesses found in the other frameworks and standards 
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reviewed. The requirements, objectives, and criteria used to determine inclusion were that the 
control was: 
• utilized by another standard and/or framework; 
o Is the control utilized or implemented by another governing body? 
• applied to both the consumer and organizations; 
o Can the control be utilized within a wide range of environments and benefit both 
consumer and organizational devices? 
• able to reduce or fill an IoT security gap; 
o Implementation of the following items reduced or filled IoT security gaps. 
• able to harden an IoT device; 
o Hardened devices removed vulnerabilities and increased the IoT device security 
posture. 
• able to increase the security of an IoT device; 
o Implementation of the following items helped mitigate threats and vulnerabilities 
within the IoT threat space. 
• utilized by other researchers; 
o The appendix lists research that used a similar approach to compare standards and 
frameworks. 
• able to improve RIOTSS functionality and effectiveness; 
o The control gave RIOTSS the functionality to better meet its purpose and be 
practically implemented. 
o The control provided an effective manner to achieve mitigation objectives and 
successfully limits IoT threats and vulnerabilities. 
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A control section needs to be developed that offers a method that can be proven and 
allows for a repeatable method within this control section. The following items were criteria used 
to measure and analyze controls to determine if they would be implemented into RIOTSS. The 
control: 
• offered clear and concise verbiage; 
o Control statements were written with clarity and easily understood. 
o Control statements were concise and comprehensive—short while providing 
direct guidance. 
• offered flexibility; 
o The control could be utilized by a wide range of IoT devices. 
• allowed for comparison of its strengths and weakness. 
o Strengths measured effective attributes and feasibility of implementation. 
o Weaknesses measured disadvantages, faults, shortcomings, or gaps. 
• provided basic properties and specific details; 
o Basic properties of the control demonstrated minimum mitigation attributes. 
o Specific details of the control addressed certain aspects of the threat space. 
Once the control selection process was completed for the base framework, the process was 
repeated in further rounds to build and strengthen RIOTSS. This process continued until all 
standards and frameworks selected for inclusion in RIOTSS were assessed. The following figure 
visually demonstrated the process of selecting individual controls during each round. 
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Figure 2. The step by step control selection process. 
RIOTSS Development 
 After round six of review and analysis was complete, individual items were added to 
specific categories within RIOTSS. Once compiled and assimilated, then consolidation of chosen 




•If a framework was not already sorted into categories or sections, it was divided into these.
•The categories or sections were mapped to each of the ten RIOTSS sections
Step 
2
•Analyze and Review For Additional Benefit:
•Each control from the framework was analyzed to determine if it was clear, concise, and flexible for 
inclusion into RIOTSS.
•Each control is analyzed to compare its strength and weakness along with basic properties and specific 
detail for inclusion into RIOTSS





•Each control from the framework was evaluated to determine if it increased the functionality of RIOTSS.
•Each control from the framework was evaluated to determine if it increased the security posture of IoT 
devices.




•Each control from the framework was evaluated to determine if it offered a new control to be included into 
RIOTSS.
•Each control from the framework was evaluated to determine if it offered a new feature or technology that 
RIOTSS did NOT support.
•Industry Standards and Best Practices:
•Each control from the framework was evaluated to determine if it followed current industry security 
standards.





•If the new control reviewed would increase the security posture or hardened an IoT device, the current 
control was replaced.
•If the new control did not benefit RIOTSS, it was discarded and the current control was kept in place.
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If duplicate events were found, the item with the most clarity and applicability to IoT security 
became part of the RIOTSS framework. 
At this point in the project, it was decided to move away from the NIST standard 
structure and use the IoT security compliance framework [47] structure, since it offered a simple 
method to determine if a control was needed. The IoT security compliance framework was 
divided into a five-class system, from zero to four (discussed in Chapter 7); the class depended 
on the function and purpose of the device. There were two choices for each class: either 
mandatory or advisory. This method of decision-making allowed for a simple determination for 
applying or skipping a class, based on the needs of the organization or corporation. 
The columns of the RIOTSS template are listed and explained next: 
 module: the category for each section; 
 organization standard/framework: the organization from which the category originated; 
 classification/domain: the label given by the originator of the standard/framework; 
 ref ID/sequence #: the item number given by the originator of the standard/framework; 
 title: the title given by the originator of the standard/framework; 
 description of requirement: a brief overview of the device check; 
 compliance class: the classification rating from zero to four (see Table 4); 
 category applicability: segmented into two groups—consumer and organization; tells 
whether a check is required or recommended/optional; 
 mitigation methods: the steps used in mitigating the issues found; and 
 comments: any additional information needed. 
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              Consumer Organization     
1–Configuration (CFG) 
2–Hardware (HW) 
3–Software and mobile apps (SAP) 
4–Operating system (OS) 
5–Encryption and key management (KKM) 
6–Authentication and authorization (A&A) 
7–Wired/Wi-Fi and network elements (WWNE) 
8–Cloud and web user interface (WUI) 
9–Privacy and ownership transfer (POT) 
10–Test and validate (T&V) 
Note. Category applicability: R = required, O = recommended/optional consumer/organization. 
Risk Assessments/Compliance Audits Using RIOTSS 
Following analysis and comparison of the various standards and frameworks, a working 
model of RIOTSS was in place, and this research was able to evaluate and conduct risk 
assessments and security compliance audits on IoT devices. This process was the last milestone 
completed prior to the release RIOTSS for use. A RIOTSS demonstration was needed, so 
organizations implementing this framework understood the process and functionality. 
 A review of changes was made prior to using the RIOTSS or discussing the process of 
using RIOTSS to conduct a security assessment and compliance. This was useful as an 
evaluation of RIOTSS, particularly since RIOTSS had a completely different look and feel than 
the initial concept or draft. 
Original RIOTSS Concept and Draft 
 The original concept for RIOTSS were based on NIST standards with a look and feel of 
800-54, in particular, because NIST standards were simple to use, with a design and layout that 
was easy to read and follow. NIST is a well-recognized organization, and NIST standards are 
highly regarded and respected. The most noticeable alteration from the original concept was the 
framework move away from a scoring system to a required or recommended control 
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implementation process. The early draft included a rating system and how variables affected IoT 
devices, including the bearing they had on the overall assessment and compliance of an IoT 
device. 
Model for RIOTSS 
 The RIOTSS updated design and format was a combination of two other IoT security 
frameworks, one of which was the IoT Security Compliance Framework Release 1 (December 
2017) developed by the IoT Security Foundation (IOTSF), and the other was the OTA IoT Trust 
Framework v2.5 (updated 10/14/2017) developed by the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) and the 
Internet Society (ISOC). Each of these organizations used a different method to determine how 
controls were implemented on IoT devices, with a common approach to ensure controls were 
implemented. They used different formats to determine which control would be implemented. 
The OTA IoT Trust Framework v2.5 used a method that divided 40 controls into 4 groups; 
within these groups, the controls were either required or recommended for implementation. The 
IoT Security Compliance Framework Release 1 was also either mandatory or advisory but 
included more detail and greater granularity within the framework. The IoT Security Compliance 
Framework Release 1 was divided into 13 sections and offered 5 compliance classes ranging 
from 0 to 4. This framework only assessed IoT devices of a class one or higher and had the 
ability to evaluate and assess consumer and business/origination base devices. Version one only 
assessed and evaluated consumer IoT devices. 
 Both of these frameworks used a wide variety of security best practices, including 
industrial security standards and processes, for mitigation to reduce security risks to IoT devices. 
They ensured security was applied to IoT devices and that there were frameworks to follow that 
increased the security of IoT devices. Even though these two frameworks provided some 
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increase to the security of IoT devices, both still had gaps and failed to offer a complete IoT 
security solution. By incorporating key features and security benefits into RIOTSS, the new 
framework capitalized on the positive. 
RIOTSS Design and Format 
RIOTSS was built by combining a wide range of standards and frameworks. The 
RIOTSS structure appears in Figure 3. This was the basic shell/template populated with various 
controls, compliance classes, and implementation requirements. 
Table 5 highlighted some of the features incorporated from the various standards and 
frameworks that made RIOTSS simple to read and easy to complete; this offered IoT devices an 
approach to increased security. 
Table 5 Compliance Class and Security Objectives [47] 
 Security Objective 
Compliance Class Integrity Availability Confidentiality 
Class 0 Basic Basic Basic 
Class 1 Medium Medium Basic 
Class 2 Medium High Medium 
Class 3 Medium High High 
Class 4 High High High 
 
 Table 5 lists the five compliance classes and the security objectives for each of the 
compliance classifications. Table 6 lists both the compliance class and security objective. This 
provides general background information for how controls were applied to the compliance 
classification. 
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Table 6 Criteria Used for Classifying Compliance Class 
Criteria for Compliance Class Criteria Security Objective 
Class 0: where compromise to the data 
generated or loss of control is likely to result in 
little discernible impact on an individual or 
organization. 
Integrity 
Basic—devices or services the malfunction of which would have a minor 
or negligible impact on an individual or organization. 
Medium—devices or services the malfunction of which would have a 
limited impact on an individual or organization. 
High—devices or services the malfunction of which would have a 
significant or catastrophic impact on an individual or organization. 
Availability 
Basic—devices or services the lack of which would cause minor 
disruption. 
Medium—devices or services the lack of which would have a limited 
impact on an individual or organization. 
High—devices or services the lack of which would have a significant 
impact on an individual or organization.  
Confidentiality 
Basic—devices or service processing public information. 
Medium—devices or services processing sensitive information, including 
PII, the compromise of which would have limited impact on an individual 
or organization. 
High—devices or services processing very sensitive information including 
sensitive personal data the compromise of which would have a significant 
impact on an individual or organization. 
Class 1: Where compromise to the generated or 
loss of contr0l is likely to result in no more than 
limited impact on an individual or organization. 
Class 2: in addition to class1, the device is 
designed to resist attacks on availability that 
would have a significant impact on an individual 
or organization, or affect many individuals for 
example by limiting operations of an 
infrastructure to which it is connected. 
Class 3: in addition to class 2, the device is 
designed to protect sensitive data including 
sensitive personal data. 
Class 4: in addition to class 3, where 
compromise to the data generated or loss of 
control have the potential to affect critical 
infrastructure or cause personal injury. 
 
The definitions for required and optional/recommended applications within the RIOTSS 
framework follow. 
• R = required: “This requirement shall be met as it is vital to secure the product category” 
[47] and 
• O = optional/recommend: “This recommendation should be met unless there are sound 
reasons (e.g., economic, viability, hardware complexity); the reasons for deviating from 
the recommendation should be documented” [47]. 
RIOTSS was designed to assess and evaluate both consumer and business/organizational class 
IoT devices, similar to the manner in which the IoT Security Compliance Framework Release 1 
was capable of conducting the same tests and validations. 
RIOTSS Framework 
 The RIOTSS framework was comprised of 10 sections, following the consolidation, and 
streamlining of some with others to decrease complexity. Table 7 shows each section title and 
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the corresponding section number. Each section was meant to be used as a stand-alone 
assessment to provide security guidance. RIOTSS was designed in this fashion for vendors and 
manufacturers of IoT devices and products, especially because some created or received various 
parts from other suppliers. In this way, the corresponding parties were able to use the section or 
sections that applied to them, and their IoT device partners did the same. 
Table 7 Section Numbers and Titles 
Sections  Title 
1 Configuration 
2 Device hardware  
3 Device software and mobile application 
4 Operating system 
5 Encryption and key management for hardware 
6 A&A 
7 Device wired and wireless interfaces network elements 
8 Cloud and web user interface 
9 Privacy/ownership transfer 
10 Test/validate  
 
 Since there were 10 sections in RIOTSS, each with a specific purpose, it was useful to 
provide a general understanding of each section. The first section looked at device configuration 
and included; but was not limited to; updates, patches, assigned security attributes, architecture 
design, and developer requirements. Section two was focused on ensuring hardware was 
developed and implemented in a secure manner; hardware devices should only be implemented 
in a hardened state. 
Section three performed the same security benefits as section one and two with 
application to software development and mobile applications. Section four provided the same 
benefits as section three to operating systems. Section five ensured encryption and certificates 
were used properly, including management and proper protection of keys. 
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Section six dealt with A&A, including password management, length, storage, reuse, and 
resets. Section six implemented other secure means to authenticate and authorize users, such as 
single sign-on, multiple factor credentials, and account lockout, to name a few. Section seven 
analyzed the security of wired, wireless, network elements, and any other types of data 
transmission, including but limited to Bluetooth and WPAN. 
In short, section eight verified that cloud solutions and web user interfaces were 
developed in a secure state and that stored information was adequately protected. Section nine 
ensured that end-user data and privacy were maintained, stored, and handled via secure means, 
and provided a secure method when a sale or transfer was made. Section 10 provided methods to 
verify that the other sections were carried out using secure techniques. 
Combining RIOTSS Sections 
RIOTSS grouped some sections with common technology or a mutual relationship. 
Pairing the wired, Wi-Fi, and network elements into one module clustered communication 
technology such as Bluetooth, Zee-Bee, and WPAN devices. Likewise, both software and mobile 
apps involved designing or developing a specific product could be used to secure programming, 
and had similar controls to prevent or reduce security risks. Similar reasons were used for 
combining cloud and web user interfaces since cloud solutions also had a user web interface. 
Privacy and ownership transfer were combined because ownership transfer had the primary focus 
on privacy assurance and data protection of the transferring owner. 
RIOTSS Framework Assessment 
Since the architecture, engineering, design, and development changed dramatically since 
the original concept of RIOTSS, performing a security assessment and evaluation was a different 
process than initially discussed. Since RIOTSS determined which controls were implemented, 
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there was no need to conduct an assessment to do so. With RIOTSS, there were only two options 
for implementation of a control—required or recommended. In the original design, one needed to 
assign a risk value to determine if a control was used. The updated version of RIOTSS was 
designed for vendors and manufacturers of IoT devices or parts. A majority of the controls 
applied at this level. Also, some controls would not apply to the average IoT consumer device, 
since most are based on the category of class one. 
RIOTSS was developed for use by vendors and manufacturers of IoT components, 
devices, and products during the item lifecycle, from concept to the end of life. There were some 
sections and components that could be assessed and evaluated; some of the security features that 
could be tested included but were not limited to device patches, updates, using Bluetooth best 
practices, privacy, and ownership transfers. 
To properly evaluation and compare the various security frameworks, and to ensure that 
data were being properly protected with encryption it was important to review the research work 
in [51], these researchers “presents a security evaluation” [51] and “comparison of encryption 
schemes” [51]. By reviewing [51] helped to evaluate that the various security standards being 
reviewed within the RIOTSS research project incorporated a process to verify that data were 
being protected using a strong encryption method. 
RIOTSS Threat Space Assessment 
 This section reviewed and analyzed RIOTSS to verify controls implemented in the 
RIOTSS framework mitigating the items discussed in 7.1.11. RIOTSS section six authenticated 
and authorized controls 6.5 and 6.15, which prevented hard-coding issues. Controls 6.5 and 6.18 
mitigated the use of weak passwords. RIOTSS defended against weak encryption standards by 
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implementing controls 5.9 and 5.13 of section five. The Bluetooth threat space issue was 
mitigated by implementing controls 7.21, 7.22, and 7.33 within section seven. 
Even though controls were implemented in the RIOTSS framework to reduce and prevent 
threat space events from occurring, it remained the vendor’s and manufacturer’s responsibility to 
ensure RIOTSS was properly utilized. The risk assessment of the Apple Watch 2 tested RIOTSS’ 
capability of mitigating threat space events. 
Chapters Contribution Summary 
 The purpose of this section is to highlight and briefly discuss how this chapter was able to 
validate the thesis statement, support the project objectives, and prove the RIOTSS project offers 
a contribution to the research community. Within this chapter, thesis statement two was validated 
by building a template to expand upon. Each round of RIOTSS development validated this. 
Validation of thesis statement three occurred through analysis of the standards and frameworks 
and provides for mitigation methods based on industry standards and IT security best practices. 
This chapter supported objectives one through four via the development of the RIOTSS 
framework and an assessment of the Apple Watch 2 using the finalized version of RIOTSS. 
Additionally, a systematic process was created to assess IoT devices to increase security and data 
protection. This also validated thesis statement one. 
This chapter does support contribution two due to the fact that RIOTSS is being 
constructed developing a security framework with controls that may be applied, to increase 
security while maintaining the IoT device’s usability and flexibility. Also, contribution three was 
not supported merely because this chapter did not analyze gaps or weaknesses in various 
standards and frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYZING SECURITY STANDARDS FOR RIOTSS 
 RIOTSS was created utilizing various frameworks and standards, looking for gaps and 
weaknesses within these standards. Once these gaps and weaknesses were determined, they were 
included in RIOTSS. The starting point for RIOTSS was NIST 800-53rev4. This foundation for 
RIOTSS was and will continue to be expanded upon to add weaknesses and gaps ascertained via 
evaluation of other standards and frameworks. 
The Development of RIOTSS Using NIST 800-53rev4 
 To create RIOTSS, NIST 800-53rev4 was analyzed to determine which sections did not 
apply to IoT device manufacturers or IoT devices. During the review, it was determined that no 
single section of the 800-53 could be easily removed. For example, the section regarding 
awareness training (AT) is focused on cybersecurity awareness training, which would not apply 
when strictly analyzing the security of IoT devices since IoT devices are consumer-based 
products. With more in-depth analysis, the AT section may apply to manufacturers who create, 
develop, and produce IoT devices since cybersecurity awareness training increases the overall 
security of IoT devices. Since beginning this project, NIST released a newer draft of 800-53 
rev5. Some differences within this standard include new sections such as asset management, 
business environment, governance, and risk assessment. Since rev5 is only in the draft phase, 
RIOTSS will continue to use rev4 as a foundation. 
 The sections of NIST 800-53 rev4 that were not utilized to create the foundation of 
RIOTSS were AT, contingency planning, incident response, media protection, physical and 
environmental protection, and personal security. With the foundation built, other standards could 
be analyzed to determine where gaps existed. Once the gaps and weakness were isolated, they 
were included in the RIOTSS framework [52]. 
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Analyzing Other NIST Security Frameworks 
 Since RIOTSS was developed using NIST 800-53 rev4, it should also be compared to 
other NIST frameworks. NIST published the Cybersecurity v1 framework in February 2014. 
This standard was designed for critical infrastructure, but other organizations adopted this 
standard to assess their overall security. The NIST Cybersecurity v1 framework incorporated 
many of the 800-53 rev4 controls; given this, none of the NIST Cybersecurity v1 framework 
controls were integrated into RIOTSS. 
 NIST SP 1800-8 Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps in Healthcare Delivery Organizations 
was also compared to RIOTSS. This framework discussed assessing wireless infusion pumps and 
provided mitigation steps for the discovered threats. NIST SP 1800-8 referenced NIST 
frameworks 800-30, 800-37, and 800-53. Because this was built with 800-53 considered, no 
controls from NIST SP 1800-8 were added to RIOTSS. After finding the repeated nature of 
NIST documents, the need to analyze, review, and compare NIST 1800-1 (Securing Electronic 
Health Records on Mobile Devices Standards), NIST 1800-5 (IT Asset Management: Financial 
Services), and NIST 500-320 (Report of the Workshop on Software Measures and Metrics to 
Reduce Security Vulnerabilities) was negated by their inclusion of 800-53. A few controls from 
NIST 800-121 (Guide to Bluetooth Security) were incorporated into RIOTSS, particularly 
regarding Bluetooth connections, pairing and security, and the ability to ensure that Bluetooth 
security was implemented using best practices during all phases of Bluetooth operations. NIST 
800-121 was incorporated to help increase WPAN security [53]. 
The Development of RIOTSS Using Other Security Frameworks 
 The frameworks and standards used in this study were freely available in the public 
domain; these frameworks and standards were open source and offered at no cost. These security 
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standards were evaluated to locate weaknesses or gaps for inclusion in RIOTSS. Known and 
unknown frameworks were reviewed and compared against RIOTSS to make this determination. 
Weaknesses and gaps were then added to the RIOTSS framework. 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)/Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) 
 The Cloud Security Alliance developed the CCM version 3.0.1 (CCMv3.0.1) to assess 
cloud security. According to CloudSecurityAlliance.org: 
The Cloud Security Alliance/Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) is specifically designed to 
provide fundamental security principles to guide cloud vendors and to assist prospective 
cloud customers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider. The CSA CCM 
provides a controls framework that gives a detailed understanding of security concepts 
and principles that are aligned to the Cloud Security Alliance guidance in 13 domains. 
[46] 
This standard was selected because IoT devices connected to the cloud in the same 
manner, and if the cloud environment was insecure, then the IoT device and user were at risk and 
vulnerable. The inclusion of CCMv3.0.1 into RIOTSS was another step to protect IoT devices 
properly. CCMv3.0.1 was analyzed and compared against RIOTSS, where several gaps and 
weaknesses could be closed due to the integration of the CCMv3.0.1 controls in RIOTSS [46]. 
Individual evaluation of each component was the method used to determine which CCM 
items would be selected to address gaps and enhance the security and effectiveness of RIOTSS. 
Analysis and comparison of components involved a sophisticated approach of selecting items to 
provide a higher security footprint and better mitigation process. The process compared and 
analyzed each item to determine if the specific component would increase security and reduce 
weaknesses. If a review of the specific component concluded it reduced gaps and weaknesses 
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while increasing device security, this was added to the RIOTSS framework. This method 
improved functionally while maintaining the flexibility and integrity of RIOTSS. 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 
 The next area analyzed was the OWASP top 10, which was not a standard or framework 
but a list of the 10 most substantial vulnerabilities critical to web application security (according 
to OWASP) [48]. According to owasp.org: 
The OWASP Top 10 is a powerful awareness document for web application security. It 
represents a broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications. 
Project members include a variety of security experts from around the world who have 
shared their expertise to produce this list. . . . We urge all companies to adopt this 
awareness document within their organization and start the process of ensuring that their 
web applications minimize these risks. Adopting the OWASP Top 10 is perhaps the most 
effective first step toward changing the software development culture within your 
organization into one that produces secure code. [48] 
This list was included because IoT devices used web applications and/or had a cloud 
presence; since IoT devices utilized web applications, it was essential to review the top-rated 
risks. Developers of IoT devices needed to review and follow the recommendations of OWASP 
to ensure that IoT applications and devices used were hardened and properly secured. Most of 
the OWASP top 10 issues would be mitigated with RIOTSS following the inclusion of CCMv3 
controls. The exception to this was logging and monitoring, which does not only apply to the 
OWASP list. This issue applies to all the standards and frameworks reviewed. IoT devices were 
found to have limited resources and logs increased demand, and most users never took time to 
review the log. Logging and monitoring functions would be useful if IoT devices were deployed 
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within an organization with infrastructure, technology, and skills to effectively utilize these 
features [48]. 
The method used to determine which OWASP items would be selected to reduce gaps 
and enhance the security and effectiveness of RIOTSS was to evaluate each component 
individually. Analysis and comparison of components involved a sophisticated approach of 
selecting items to provide a greater security footprint and better mitigation process. The process 
compared and analyzed each item to determine if the specific component would increase security 
and reduce weaknesses. When a review of the specific component concluded it reduced gaps and 
weaknesses while increasing device security, this was added to the RIOTSS framework. This 
method improved functionally while maintaining the flexibility and integrity of RIOTSS. 
Internet of Things Security Foundation 
 The IOTSF’s “mission is to help secure the IoT, in order to aid its adoption and maximize 
its benefits. To do this, we will promote knowledge and clear best practice in appropriate 
security to those who specify, make, and use IoT products and systems” [47]. Their motto was 
“build secure, buy secure, be secure” [47]. 
 IOTSF published three documents related to IoT compliance, security, and 
vulnerabilities. These three documents were analyzed to determine if RIOTSS could be 
improved upon by implementing each security control highlight. The first document reviewed 
was Vulnerability Disclosure v1.0 Best Practice Guideline, which discussed how researchers 
could work with IoT device producers to resolved discovered issues. This had no direct effect on 
RIOTSS but did benefit RIOTSS indirectly by providing guidance on how to work with 
RIOTSS’ target organization [47, and 54]. 
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The second IOTSF document reviewed was the Connected Consumer Products Security 
Design Best Practice Guideline, of which no contents were integrated into RIOTSS. The 
Connected Consumer Products Security Design Best Practice Guideline was an excellent 
resource for the IoT environment. RIOTSS did use items from the IOTSF security compliance 
framework, which was the next document from IOTSF to be analyzed. The security compliance 
framework designed by IOTSF was a straightforward approach to security compliance. After 
analyzing this framework and the controls used, it was noted that these controls allowed for 
better protection and a cleaner or more straightforward implementation than others. Even though 
this was a robust framework for IoT devices, one of the biggest weaknesses was that this 
framework did not provide guidance or have an in-depth analysis of the configuration for IoT 
devices. The IOTSF configuration section only recommended one check be conducted on IoT 
devices. To strengthen this, other frameworks’ configuration would need to be incorporated to 
increase the security of the configuration section of the IOTSF framework [47, and 54]. 
The method used to determine which IOTSF items would be selected to reduce gaps and 
enhance the security and effectiveness of RIOTSS was to evaluate each component individually. 
Analysis and comparison of components involved a sophisticated approach of selecting items to 
provide a greater security footprint and better mitigation process. The process compared and 
analyzed each item to determine if the specific component would increase security and reduce 
weaknesses. If a review of the specific component concluded it reduced gaps and weaknesses 
while increasing device security, this was added to the RIOTSS framework. This method 
improved functionally while maintaining the flexibility and integrity of RIOTSS. 
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Online Trust Alliance and The Internet Society 
 The Online Trust Alliance and the ISOC developed a framework knows as IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5. OTA: 
serves as a product development and risk assessment guide for developers, purchasers, 
and retailers of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the framework is the foundation for 
future IoT certification programs. OTA’s goal is to highlight devices and companies that 
demonstrate a commitment to device lifecycle security and embrace responsible privacy 
practices. [55] 
 This framework was relatively condensed and incorporated many unique controls that 
other standards had not yet integrated. RIOTSS incorporates many controls from the IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5, due to its uniqueness. A critical difference between OTA and ISOC and other 
standards and frameworks was that these groups set themselves apart as being transparent by 
keeping consumers well informed. They disclosed much information about IoT device functions 
and information that was getting collected and stored. OTA and ISOC also included verbiage and 
statements within their IoT Security and Privacy Trust Framework related to adhering to industry 
standards and best practices [55]. 
The section and controls from IoT Trust Framework® v2.5 integrated into RIOTSS were 
transparency issues and use of best practice controls. The OTA framework was focused on 
protecting and securing consumer data; the organization’s framework deals with breech, 
response, and notice. One primary benefit of incorporating this framework into RIOTSS was that 
it ensured consumer privacy protection and end-user information security [55]. 
The method used to determine which OTA items would be selected to reduce gaps and 
enhance the security and effectiveness of RIOTSS was to evaluate each component individually. 
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Analysis and comparison of components involved a sophisticated approach of selecting items to 
provide a greater security footprint and better mitigation process. The process compared and 
analyzed each item to determine if the specific component would increase security and reduce 
weaknesses. If a review of the specific component concluded it reduced gaps and weaknesses 
while increasing device security, this was added to the RIOTSS framework. This method 
improved functionally while maintaining the flexibility and integrity of RIOTSS. 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) 
 OASIS was a non-profit organization that developed standards for a wide range of IT-
related technologies, including security and IoT. According to Oasis-Open.org: 
OASIS promotes industry consensus and produces worldwide standards for security, IoT, 
cloud computing, energy, content technologies, emergency management, and other areas. 
OASIS open standards offer the potential to lower cost, stimulate innovation, grow global 
markets, and protect the right of free choice of technology . . . OASIS members broadly 
represent the marketplace of public and private sector technology leaders, users, and 
influencers. The consortium has more than 5,000 participants representing over 600 
organizations and individual members in more than 65 countries. [56] 
OASIS Standard Classification of Everyday Living Version 1.0 assessed the security and 
privacy of personal data. This standard conducted an assessment to determine the overall security 
of personal data and the collection method used. This standard offered some unique controls but 
did not fill any gaps to strengthen RIOTSS prior to implementation. RIOTSS had streamlined 
controls in place that performed similar functions that were straightforward to evaluate [56]. 
The method used to determine which OASIS items would be selected to reduce gaps and 
enhance the security and effectiveness of RIOTSS was to evaluate each component individually. 
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Analysis and comparison of components involved a sophisticated approach of selecting items to 
provide a greater security footprint and better mitigation process. The process compared and 
analyzed each item to determine if the specific component would increase security and reduce 
weaknesses. If a review of the specific component concluded it reduced gaps and weaknesses 
while increasing device security, this was added to the RIOTSS framework. This method 
improved functionally while maintaining the flexibility and integrity of RIOTSS. 
Building, Developing and Modeling RIOTSS 
 Following the analysis for gaps and weaknesses among the other standards and 
frameworks to build RIOTSS, a long list of controls could be implemented in a comprehensive 
process. Initially, each control migrated from another standard or framework was still grouped 
according to its origin. It was possible to conduct an evaluation of IoT devices using RIOTSS, 
but this was not efficient or productive since the controls were not organized by classification or 
category. 
The next development step was to review the controls and sort them by classification 
and/or domain. This allowed the evaluation of IoT devices to progress concurrently and in a 
smooth, continuous method. Grouping the controls by classification/domain ensured that each 
control was specific in nature so that no two controls tested the same specific feature. 
The classification/domain breakdown for RIOTSS was 15 categories instead of the 26 
initially drafted during conceptual design. The original 26 groups reflected the NIST 800-53 
framework. The redesign was due to the conundrum that, using the NIST classifications, it was 
possible that specific controls could be listed in two or more classifications depending on 
perspective and opinion. To resolve this issue, the classifications were reduced to 15 groups, 
listed in Table 8. From these 15, the latest version of RIOTSS implemented 10. The three 
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highlighted in yellow will be part of future work and the next release/version of RIOTSS, and 
will briefly be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Table 8 RIOTTS Classification Domains 
RIOTSS Classification/Domain 
Business security processes and responsibility Physical security 
Secure supply chain and production Testing/validating 
Device hardware Device software 
Device operating system Configuration 
Authentication and authorizations Encryption and key management for hardware 
Web user interface Mobile application 
Privacy Device ownership transfer 
Device wired and wireless interfaces Cloud and network elements 
 
 The 10-module RIOTSS framework consists of included configuration, hardware, 
software and mobile apps, operating system (OS), authentication and authorization (A&A), 
encryption and key management, wired/Wi-Fi and network (ntwk) elements, cloud and web user 
interface (UI), privacy and ownership transfer, and test and validation. Some standards and 
frameworks reviewed opted to have separate sections for software, mobile apps, wired, Wi-Fi, 
network elements, cloud, web UI, privacy, and ownership transfer. RIOTSS opted to group or 
pair some of the sections since some have common technology or mutual relationships. Pairing 
the wired, Wi-Fi, and network elements into one module helped incorporate other 
communication technology; such as Bluetooth, Zee-Bee, and WPAN devices; into this module. 
Likewise, combining software and mobile apps into a single module worked well, since both 
would include designing and developing a specific product, could use secure programming 
practices, and have similar controls to prevent or reduce software or mobile app security risks. 
Similar reasons were also applied when pairing cloud and web UI since some cloud solutions 
included a web interface. The reason to combine privacy and ownership transfer was because the 
main focus of ownership transfer was privacy and data protection for the previous owner. 
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Following this compilation, the RIOTSS framework was in a stable condition. No other security 
standards or frameworks were needed to be included or incorporated into RIOTSS, which 
reflected gaps and weaknesses discovered during the analysis and comparison of various security 
standards and frameworks. 
 The development of and method to build RIOTSS was discussed in previous sections and 
can be described in six steps as follows: 
• Step one—if the framework did not already have controls grouped into sections, they 
were categorized and then mapped to RIOTSS. 
• Step two—the individual controls were analyzed to see if they were clear, concise, 
flexible, and offered additional benefits to RIOTSS. 
• Step three—the control was evaluated to determine if it offered new or increased 
functionality, strengthened security or hardened IoT devices to improve the security 
posture of the IoT device. 
• Step four—the individual control was reviewed for features not currently included in 
RIOTSS and to ensure it followed industry standards and security best practices. 
• Step five—current RIOTSS controls were replaced with those that were found to improve 
RIOTSS, such as the addition of a new feature or function. 
• Step six—maintenance of RIOTSS occurred as new standards and frameworks were 
reviewed for possible inclusion. This was done by repeating steps one through five. This 
step continually ensured that RIOTSS was meeting the security demands of IoT devices. 
The following figure is a visual representation of the RIOTSS development steps. 
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Figure 3. Six steps for developing RIOTSS. 
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Standards and Frameworks Summary 
The following standards and frameworks were selected and used for the RIOTSS project: 
• CCMv3.0.1 [46], 
• NIST 800.53 rev 4 [55], 
• OASIS Classification for Everyday Living version 1.0 [48 and 47], 
• IOTSF security compliance framework [47], 
• OTA IoT Trust Alliance framework [55], and 
• OWASP Top Ten [48]. 
 CCMv3.0.1 contained “fundamental security principles to guide cloud vendors and to 
assist cloud customers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider” [46], which 
“strengthens information security control environments by delineating control guidance by 
service provider and consumer, and by differentiating according to cloud model type and 
environment” [46]. CCMv3.0.1 “provides a controls framework in 16 domains that are cross-
walked to other industry-accepted security standards, regulations, and controls frameworks to 
reduce audit complexity” [46]. It offered 140 controls within its framework, which made it about 
25% smaller than RIOTSS. These gaps were why CCM was not considered a valid framework 
for IoT devices. 
NIST 800-53 rev4: 
represents the most comprehensive update to the security controls catalog since its 
inception in 2005. The publication was developed by NIST, Special Publication 800-53, 
Revision 4, provides a more comprehensive approach to information security and risk 
management by providing organizations with the breadth and depth of security controls 
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necessary to fundamentally strengthen their information systems and the environment. 
[53] 
It offered around 650 controls for implementation, about 20% more controls than RIOTSS. 
Many do not adequately protect IoT devices, as demonstrated by this project. 
OASIS classification for everyday living provided “a clear and robust framework for 
implementing a distributed system capable of capturing data relating to an individual as discrete 
events. It facilitates a privacy-by-design approach for personalized digital services, IoT 
applications where devices are collecting information” [56]. This led to a: 
desire to create an international standard for collecting and handling personal data that 
provides both privacy for consumers and opportunities for enterprise, and the COEL 
specification is built on the systematic application of the idea that the events of everyday 
life can be treated as behavioral atoms. [56] 
OASIS offered approximately 100 controls, approximately 80% smaller than RIOTSS, leaving 
numerous gaps for system compromise. 
IoTSF advocated: 
the core security values of security first, fitness of purpose and resilience. All . . . efforts 
can be linked back to these core values and . . . provide practical, accessible, low-cost 
tools to industry, to ensure the provision of comprehensive security capability. Consumer 
IoT products, in particular, present acute security concerns today and there is an urgent 
need for best practice guidance—this is the sector primarily targeted by “Release 1” of 
the framework . . . especially beneficial to companies. [47] 
IoTSF contained around 205 controls, approximately 40% smaller that RIOTSS, leaving gaps 
and weaknesses that allowed exploited and system compromise. 
62 
 OTA: 
outlines . . . comprehensive disclosures which need to be provided prior to product 
purchase, policies regarding data collection, usage, and sharing, as well as the terms and 
conditions of security patching post-warranty. Security updates are essential to maximize 
the protection of IoT devices when vulnerabilities are discovered, and attacks evolve. In 
addition, the framework provides recommendations for manufacturers to enhance 
transparency and communication regarding devices’ ability to be updated and a range of 
data privacy-related issues. [55] 
The OTA framework was the smallest framework reviewed and implemented into RIOTSS with 
only 40 controls focused on protecting user data, ensuring privacy, and providing transparency. 
With only 40 controls, not even 10% of the overall size of RIOTSS, this framework had many 
weaknesses to address, particularly since OTA would like to serve “as a risk assessment guide 
for developers, purchasers, and retailers” . . . as “the foundation for future IoT certification 
programs. It is the goal of OTA to highlight devices which meet these standards to help 
consumers” [55]. 
The OWASP Top 10 of 2017 were: 
based primarily on 40+ data submissions from firms that specialize in application security 
and an industry survey that was completed by over 500 individuals. This data spans 
vulnerabilities gathered from hundreds of organizations and over 100,000 real-world 
applications and APIs. The Top 10 items are selected and prioritized according to this 
prevalence data, in combination with consensus estimates of exploitability, detectability, 
and impact. A primary objective of the OWASP top 10 is to educate developers, 
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designers, architects, managers, and organizations about the consequences of the most 
common and most important web application security weaknesses. [48] 
OWASP was the smallest list of vulnerability checks reviewed. The OWASP top 10 was only 
meant for web application security. This is the reason OWASP was selected for analysis since 
most IoT devices had some type of cloud-based web application. With only 10 checks analyzed, 
OWASP was less than 2% of the size of RIOTSS. 
 RIOTSS is the second-largest framework in this research project, and one of the largest 
available. The most substantial framework analyzed here was NIST 800-53 rev4. The following 
compares the number of controls per framework to RIOTSS: 
• CMv3.0.1, with around 140 controls, is 70% smaller than RIOTSS; 
• NIST 800.53 rev 4, with around 650 controls, is 25% bigger than RIOTSS; 
• OASIS classification for everyday living version, with approximately 100 controls, is 
80% smaller than RIOTSS; 
• IOTSF Security Compliance framework, with 205 controls, is about 45% smaller than 
RIOTSS; 
• OTA IoT Trust Alliance framework, with 40 controls, is less than 10% of RIOTSS; and 
• OWASP top 10 is 10 vulnerabilities that affect “web application security weaknesses” 
[48], which is less than 2% the size of RIOTSS. 
A balance in the number of controls deployed within a framework must exist. A 
framework that is too small will not provide proper security or defer risks to IoT devices. This 
makes IoT devices attractive to hackers. A framework that has too many controls is 
unmanageable, and organizations will not want to use it or will not apply it correctly. Balance 
should be achieved not in the total number of controls, but in the ability to ensure the controls 
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adequately protect IoT devices. Protection is evidenced by IoT devices configured securely, IoT 
devices hardened, encryption implemented, communication secured, user data safeguarded, and 
cloud and web applications linked to an IoT device equally secure. 
At one point, RIOTSS had over 600 controls, but this was trimmed down to make an 
efficient and effective product without reducing the security footprint. RIOTSS contains around 
475 controls, with approximately 140 controls not required during an assessment. There are 
approximately 380 controls required to be tested during an assessment providing IoT security. 
 RIOTSS structure was divided into the 10 sections previously discussed with each 
housing controls related to that section. A summary of the total number of controls in each 
section follows: 
• Section one, “Configuration,” has around 40 controls. 
• Section two, “Hardware,” has around 60 controls. 
• Section three, “Software and Mobile Apps,” has approximately 90 controls. 
• Section four, “Operating System,” has around 50 controls. 
• Section five, “Encryption and Key Management,” has approximately 15 controls. 
• Section six, “A&A,” has around 30 controls. 
• Section seven, “Network, Wi-Fi and Network Elements,” has around 40 controls. 
• Section eight, “Cloud and Web UI,” had approximately 70 controls. 
• Section nine, “Privacy and Ownership Transfer,” has around 50 controls. 
• Section 10, “Test and Validation,” has approximately 25 controls. 
RIOTSS created balance with the number of controls tested. It offered protection for IoT 
devices by ensuring proper hardening, secure encrypted communication, and data safety before 
releasing to consumers. 
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Chapter Contribution Summary 
 The purpose of this section was to highlight and briefly discuss how this chapter was able 
to validate the thesis statement, support the project objectives, and prove the RIOTSS project 
offers a contribution to the research community. Within this chapter, thesis statements two and 
three were validated through RIOTSS ability to assess the security posture of various IoT 
devices, implement industry standards, and follow IT security best practices during the 
mitigation process. 
This chapter supported objectives one through four via the development of the RIOTSS 
framework and an assessment of the Apple Watch 2 using the finalized version of RIOTSS. 
Additionally, a systematic process was created to assess IoT devices to increase security and data 
protection. Each section of Chapter 8 demonstrates contributions one and three, as each 
discussed the method and process to develop RIOTSS, a brief explanation for the reasons 
specific standards or frameworks were selected and why specific controls were implemented. 
This chapter supports contribution two because RIOTSS is a security framework with controls 




CHAPTER 6. ANALYZING STANDARDS AND FRAMEWORKS 
 To complete this project, a gap analysis was conducted on each security framework 
reviewed. Expert opinion was utilized to determine which controls were included in each 
framework. Expert opinion for the selection and usage of each element was based on a repeatable 
methodology, repudiated by adhering to the list of requirements, objectives, and criteria used as 
measurement methodology: 
• utilized by a wide range of industries, 
• applied to both the consumer and organizations, 
• reduced or fills a NIST 800-53 gap, 
• hardened an IoT device, 
• increased security of an IoT device, 
• offered clear and concise verbiage, and 
• improved RIOTSS functionality and effectiveness. 
Establishment of how each control was measured and critiqued was a significant factor in 
this project and is reproducible by other researchers for replication of this tool. A further research 
contribution was that RIOTSS offered identification of security gaps and weakness in other 
frameworks and standards. This was vital to the outcome of RIOTSS, as it helped determine 
which controls, components, and elements were added to the RIOTSS framework. 
Filling the Gaps and Weaknesses 
 During the creation of RIOTSS, controls were added to and removed from RIOTSS. 
Various frameworks and standards were analyzed for gaps and weaknesses, compared against 
RIOTSS, and missing controls were then added. Controls already included in the 800-53rev4 
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foundation or included in other standards were removed. If one standard had a control that was 
better secured IoT devices, this was utilized. In short, a control added to RIOTSS could end up 
replaced by another better option based on the requirements, objectives, and criteria used to 
measure each framework’s controls and elements. 
NIST 800-53 Rev4 
One of the first controls integrated into RIOTSS was Bluetooth security; implementing 
Bluetooth security inside RIOTSS ensured that WPAN was properly secured using best 
practices. Bluetooth and wireless controls were not incorporated with NIST 800-53 since the 
framework was initially designed for the federal government; Bluetooth and wireless devices 
were not authorized to be used or implemented within this environment, so there were no 
requirements to have these controls in place. The federal government relaxed its rules and had 
begun incorporating wireless technology in a few restricted areas. It is possible that wireless 
controls may be incorporated in 800-53rev5 [52]. NIST 800-53 offered controls to implement 
Bluetooth into the environment whereas RIOTSS offered controls to ensure vendors and 
manufacturers design and incorporate better security using industry standards and best practices 
for security within Bluetooth. 
CCMv3.0.1 
 Other controls integrated into the RIOTSS were from the CCMv3.0.1 standard. The 
controls integrated within RIOTSS mainly related to mobile code, cloud security, and threat 
management. Including these controls within RIOTSS ensured IoT devices, web interfaces, and 
cloud-based applications had better security, designs, builds, and implementations into a 
product’s lifecycle by designing and incorporating better security related to mobile code and 
cloud security. This offered an improved security product that consumers could enjoy [46]. 
68 
OWASP Top 10 
 Even though the OWASP top 10 findings were not integrated into RIOTSS, this did not 
negate the fact that OWASP was a well-known and respected organization that offered a wide 
range of knowledge and best practices. OWASP was recognized for their top 10 project. The 
OWASP top 10 was a good reference that ensured RIOTSS could mitigate findings and confirm 
IoT devices were secured correctly [48]. Using OWASP top 10 as reference material helped 
ensure all aspects were reviewed and considered to help reduce the possibility of threats and 
vulnerabilities remaining undetected during an assessment. 
IOTSF Security Compliance Framework 
 The entire IOTSF security compliance framework was integrated within RIOTSS and 
replaced some of the 800-53rev4 controls; some of the IOTSF controls offered better security 
functionality than 800-53rev4. One section in the IOTSF did not allow much hardening of the 
device; the configuration section only offered one control for implementation. The control 
discussed only the configuration of the device, and any web services needed to be tamper-proof. 
The configuration section was limited and needed more controls to protect IoT devices better. 
Since the IOTSF configuration section was weak, NIST 800-53rev and CCMv3.0.1 
configurations were added to boost device configuration security. Incorporating other controls 
into this selection was one of the easier ways to build RIOTSS, since there was but one control to 
review and analyze. Fleshing out this section still required the methodology discussed in earlier 
chapters. 
OTA IoT Trust Alliance Framework 
 The main focus of the OTA was to have an informed consumer and data usage 
transparency. The OTA opted to keep the consumer well informed of what functions IoT devices 
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performed, disclosed the method used to collect user data, shared how their information would 
be used, and how long the company planned to store the data. This was the first framework that 
ensured transparency to safeguard the consumer’s overall security. Other frameworks have not 
been as transparent as OTA, possibly because they assume vendors and manufacturers already 
have consumer awareness or product agreement notices in place [55]. Most standards and 
frameworks have not included this level of control for data usage and sharing, so incorporating 
some OTA controls within RIOTSS was important. Implementing some of the OTA components 
into RIOTSS helped reduce gaps and weaknesses remaining in other frameworks and standards, 
thus, increasing the effectiveness of RIOTSS. 
OASIS Classification of Everyday Living Version 1.0 
 Even though OASIS controls were not ably integrated into RIOTSS, OASIS was a well-
known and widely-respected body. They offered standards implemented in a wide variety of 
technologies and industries. The components of OASIS were encompassed by RIOTSS prior to 
its consideration [56]. Using OASIS as reference material helped ensure various security 
vulnerabilities were considered to reduce the possibility of risks remaining undetected during an 
assessment. 
Other Gaps and Weakness 
While analyzing the various standards and frameworks, it was noted that several 
standards and frameworks did not specifically address a few critical components that could have 
been a significant concern. These critical components included items such as firmware, BIOS, 
and middleware. Hardening and safeguarding these were considered as crucial as hardening and 
protecting components previously discussed. If the firmware, BIOS, or middleware were to be 
compromised or exploited, there could be a severe risk, and problems to the end-user, system, 
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and/or device breached and/or attacked. To prevent this, vendors and manufacturers needed to be 
aware of these risks and take the proper actions. A few standards and frameworks, along with 
RIOTSS, addressed this issue by implementing a method to upgrade and/or patch components to 
increase the security posture. One method RIOTSS used to address this issue was the 
incorporation of the STIG. This was a configuration standard used to increase specific security 
by locking down systems, hardware, software, and/or operating systems and preventing attacks 
on known weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The inclusion of STIG increased the security posture 
and prevented or reduced malicious attacks on computers and systems utilizing RIOTSS. The 
next section discusses the gaps and weaknesses of each standard and framework reviewed and 
analyzed for this project. 
Analyzing Gaps and Weaknesses 
 The reason for control inclusion or exclusion in RIOTSS was to remove gaps and 
weaknesses exposed during the evaluation of frameworks and standards. One reason there were 
gaps and weaknesses with the reviewed frameworks and standards was because they may have 
been meant as only a starting point for future work. Other explanations for the gaps and 
weaknesses within the various frameworks and standards used during this project are discussed 
next. 
NIST 800-53 Rev4 
The first gaps and weaknesses to be discussed were related to Bluetooth security; 
implementing Bluetooth security inside RIOTSS ensured that WPAN was properly secured using 
best practices. Even though NIST 800-53 addressed how to implement and deploy Bluetooth and 
wireless devices in a controlled manner, it did not address the design and development of this 
technology. One possible reason NIST 800-53 had not addressed this concern was that NIST had 
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other standards that addressed this security issue, and NIST 800-53 was meant for assessment of 
implementation and deployment for a secure system. 
CCMv3.0.1 
 Other controls integrated into the RIOTSS were from the CCMv3.0.1 standard. The 
controls integrated within RIOTSS primarily related to mobile code, cloud security, and threat 
management. Including these controls within RIOTSS ensured IoT devices, web interfaces, and 
cloud-based applications had better security, designs, builds, and implementations into a 
product’s lifecycle. This offered an improved security product that consumers could enjoy [46]. 
OWASP Top 10 
 Even though the OWASP top 10 was used as reference material and none of the OWASP 
elements or controls were integrated within RIOTSS, there were still gaps and weaknesses found 
within this standard. OWASP provided a list of the top 10 vulnerabilities that mainly focused on 
web application security. Although the top 10 could be applied to the broader aspect of 
components and systems, it was still limited to only 10 significant issues discovered. This 
resulted in the gap and weakness within this standard. Looking at one aspect of technology 
limited the number of risks and threats that could be affected by this standard. 
IOTSF Security Compliance Framework 
 Within the entire IoTSF security compliance framework, one section did not offer much 
security to devices; the configuration section only offered one control for implementation. This 
control did discuss the configuration of a device and any web service needs to be tamper proof, 
although it still did not address other aspects for configuration of hardware, software, or OS. One 
explanation might be that IoTSF believed the framework’s other controls limited or prevented 
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unauthorized access to files [47]. IoTSF may have assumed that if the framework was adhered to 
and implemented correctly, the configuration would remain secure. 
OTA IoT Trust Alliance Framework 
 The OTA framework focused on data use and storage, and end-user awareness. Even 
though OTA ensured transparency to safeguard consumer security, there were gaps and 
weaknesses within the framework. The framework was based on four key topics, including 
security principles, user access and credentials, privacy disclosure and transparency, and 
notifications and related best practices. The gaps and weaknesses within this framework stem 
from the broad approach this origination applies to the OTA framework. This organization may 
have believed that by including security principles and best practices, it offered a complete 
solution for securing IoT devices. In fact, this framework failed to address specific concerns 
related to IoT devices, including updates and patches. 
Gaps and weaknesses in other frameworks related to data usage, storage, and end-user 
privacy may have occurred because other frameworks and standards assumed vendors and 
manufacturers already had consumer awareness or product agreement notices in place. Another 
reason may be because transparency was merely overlooked, with a focus on securing the IoT 
device and not the consumer’s personal security [55]. 
OASIS Classification of Everyday Living Version 1.0 
 Even though OASIS controls were not integrated into RIOTSS, OASIS was a well-
known and widely-respected body. They offered standards implemented in a wide variety of 
technologies and industries. The components of OASIS were encompassed by RIOTSS prior to 
its consideration [56]. 
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OASIS was used as reference material with none of their controls integrated within 
RIOTSS. Gaps and weaknesses within this organization’s standards and frameworks were still 
found. The organization offered a wide range of open source frameworks that could be 
implemented in IoT device space, but it did not offer one specific to the security concerns of IoT 
devices. To secure an IoT device using OASIS, several OASIS frameworks would be needed. 
This was a weakness for OASIS since there was no single framework to secure an IoT device. 
Other Gaps and Weakness 
As discussed in section 9.1.7, several standards and frameworks did not specifically 
address critical components of significant concern, including firmware, BIOS, and middleware. 
Without these components properly hardened and safeguarded, it was possible for system 
exploitation and comprise. Hardening and safeguarding these were considered as important as 
securing other features and functions of IoT devices. One explanation for these weaknesses was 
that the various frameworks believed adhering to the framework reduced the risk of an attack on 
these items. 
A summarization of gaps and weaknesses within the various frameworks has been 
reviewed and analyzed, and along with offering a professional opinion why these were 
encountered. The next phase of the research project involved discussing how an organization 
would use the RIOTSS framework or how RIOTSS could be implemented into the overall IoT 
device development process from original conceptualization to the final product/end-user. A 
more in-depth approach to the use of RIOTSS follows in the next chapter. 
Chapter Contribution Summary 
Within this chapter, thesis statement two was validated through discussion of the gaps 
and weaknesses of various standards and frameworks used to develop and build RIOTSS. Thesis 
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statement three was not validated within Chapter 8 since this chapter focused on gaps and 
weaknesses of other standards and frameworks. 
This chapter supported objectives one through four via the development of the RIOTSS 
framework and an assessment of the Apple Watch 2 using the finalized version of RIOTSS. 
Additionally, a systematic process was created to assess IoT devices to increase security and data 
protection. Contribution one was not evidenced in Chapter 7 since various gaps and weaknesses 
within reviewed frameworks were the goals. The focus of this chapter was contribution three—
the gaps and weaknesses of considered frameworks with a brief explanation of why a specific 
standard or framework was or was not selected for inclusion into RIOTSS. This chapter supports 
contribution two because RIOTSS is a security framework with controls that may be applied to 
increase security while maintaining the IoT device’s usability and flexibility. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONDUCTING A RIOTSS ASSESSMENT 
A RIOTSS assessment was performed on an Apple Watch 2, and only assessed the 
actions and functions that the average end-user would access and/or modify. No other sections or 
controls were assessed, as they were not applicable to this assessment. The controls not assessed 
were not shown within the RIOTSS framework assessment form (Table 9). The only items 
populated were controls an end-user was able to access. 
 Findings from the RIOTSS assessment of an Apple Watch 2 with IOS 4.2 using RIOTSS 
were added to Table 9. This table reflected a small sample of the actual assessment output 
findings conducted on the Apple Watch 2; the purpose of this assessment was to demonstrate the 
benefits of RIOTSS as a single-point or use as a single security risk assessment tool for an IoT 
device. It also reveals the ease with which RIOTSS controls were implemented and determined 
which mitigation processes to implement. 
RIOTSS Apple Watch 2 Assessment 
An Apple Watch 2 assessment was performed using RIOTSS consumer-only assessment 
tools. A complete RIOTSS assessment could not be performed since some RIOTSS sections and 
controls were designed to be implemented only by the vendor or manufacturer. Because direct 
access to the vendor/manufacturer items would be needed to change and/or modify the code, 
functions, and settings, this functionality could not be assessed. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 1–Configuration 
There were 54 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 54 controls, this risk assessment included 7 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The 
reviewed controls were related to end-user agreements (EUA) and updates. The remaining 
controls would be performed by vendors and manufacturers since end-users and consumers 
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would not have access to these components or configurations. Since Apple did not offer a 
method to protect against malicious code or malware, Apple Watch 2 would not pass this 
control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 2–Device Hardware 
 There are 56 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and reviewed. 
Of the 56 controls, this risk assessment included 5 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The reviewed 
controls were related to EUA and updates. The remaining controls would be performed by 
vendors and manufacturers since end-user and consumers would not have access to these 
components or configurations, Apple Watch 2 would pass this control 
Apple Watch 2: Section 3–Device Software/Mobile Application 
There are 93 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and reviewed. 
Of the 93 controls, this risk assessment included 8 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The reviewed 
controls were related to EUA, login, and updates. The remaining controls would be performed by 
vendors and manufacturers since end-users and consumers would not have access to these 
components or configurations. Since Apple does not control third-party or associated application 
use of encryption and cannot verify the third part or associated application has incorporated 
security best practice, Apple Watch 2 would not pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 4–Operations System 
There were 49 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 49 controls, this risk assessment included 4 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The 
reviewed controls were related to EUA and updates. The remaining controls would be performed 
by vendors and manufacturers since end-users and consumers would not have access to these 
components or configurations, Apple Watch 2 would pass this control. 
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Apple Watch 2: Section 5–Encryption and Key Management 
There were 13 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 13 controls, this risk assessment included 3 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The 
reviewed controls were related to encryption. The remaining controls would be performed by 
vendors and manufacturers since end-users and consumers would not have access to these 
components or configurations. Since the reviewed controls were related to encryption and the 
assessment could only verify that encryption implemented on the device was not able to 
determine the type of encryption being used, Apple Watch 2 would pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 6–Authentication and Authorization 
There were 32 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 32 controls, this risk assessment included 10 controls for the Apple Watch 2. 
The reviewed controls were related to passwords, logons, brute force attacks, and access 
restriction. The remaining controls would be performed by vendors and manufacturers since end-
users and consumers would not have access to these components or configurations. Apple Watch 
2 allows blank passwords by default to be used this would fail this control, Apple does allow 
consumers to turn this feature off, but since RIOTSS was designed for the vendor, Apple Watch 
2 would not pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 7–Wired and Wireless Network Interface Elements 
There were 39 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 39 controls, this risk assessment included 6 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The 
reviewed controls were related to EUA, device pairing, network protocols, and updates. The 
remaining controls would be performed by vendors and manufacturers since end-users and 
consumers would not have access to these components or configurations. Apple Watch does not 
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use Bluetooth 4.2, which is the latest version of Bluetooth so this means Apple Watch 2 would 
not pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 8–Cloud and Web UIs 
There were 70 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 70 controls, this risk assessment included 4 controls for the Apple Watch 2. The 
reviewed controls were related to EUA, passwords, and updates. The remaining controls would 
be performed by vendors and manufacturers since end-users and consumers would not have 
access to these components or configurations. Since Apple did not offer a method to protect 
against malicious code or malware, Apple Watch 2 would not pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 9–Privacy and Ownership Transfer 
There were 60 controls in the RIOTSS configuration section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 60 controls, this risk assessment included 23 controls for the Apple Watch 2. 
The reviewed controls were related to EUA, PII, data storage, and deletion of data or wiping a 
device. The remaining controls would be performed by vendors and manufacturers since end-
users and consumers would not have access to these components or configurations. Since Apple 
Watch 2 was able to pass the privacy and ownership controls that were tested during this risk 
assessment, Apple Watch 2 would pass this control. 
Apple Watch 2: Section 10–Testing and Validation 
There were 24 controls in the RIOTSS testing and validation section to be analyzed and 
reviewed. Of the 24 controls, this risk assessment included 0 controls for the Apple Watch 2. 
















Title Description Requirement Complianc
e Class 










OTA IoT trust 
framework® v2.5 
Security – device, 
apps and cloud 
services 
7 
 Updates must not modify 
user-configured preferences, 
security, and/or privacy 
settings without user 
notification. In cases where 
the device firmware or 
software is overwritten, on 
first use, the user must be 
provided the ability to review 
and select privacy settings. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Updates and 




tested and did 






OTA IoT Trust 
framework® v2.5 
Security – device, 
apps and cloud 
services 
6 
 Ensure a mechanism is in 
place for automated safe and 
secure methods to provide 
software and/or firmware 
updates, patches, and 
revisions. Such updates must 
either be signed and/or 
otherwise verified as coming 
from a trusted source, 
including but not limited to 
signing and integrity checking 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 
to this control 






this control to 
verify control 
is met. Apple 
update is 
conducted in a 
safe and 
secure manner 










 The product securely stores 
any passwords using an 
industry standard 
cryptographic algorithm, for 
example, see FIPS 
140-2 [ref 5] 







Table 9. (continued) 











 The security update policy for 
devices with a constrained 
power source shall be 
assessed to balance the needs 
of maintaining the integrity 
and availability of the device. 
2 >  0 N/A NF 
 The watch 
needs to be 




for an update 
to be applied 
and installed. 
This control 
was tested and 
is able to meet 
this control  











 All the product related 
cryptographic functions are 
sufficiently secure for the 
lifecycle of the product, e.g., 
those stipulated in NIST 
SP800-131A 






type is not 
published or 
found on open 
source sites 











Table 9. (continued) 
6.3 











Requiring individuals to take, 
and having devices 
implement, specific security 
safeguards to protect 
authenticators 
1 > R N/A O 
Risk 
accepted. 









































should be at the most secure 
versions available and/or 
appropriate for the product. 
For example, Bluetooth 4.2 
rather than 4.0. 
























3 is compliant 
Apple Watch 
2 does NOT 
need this 
control 









 Where passwords are entered 
on a UI, the actual passphrase 
is obscured by default to 
prevent the capture of 
passwords 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 




tested too and 
is able to meet 
this control  

















 Comply with applicable 
regulations, including but not 
limited to the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) and international 
privacy, security, and data 
transfer regulatory 
requirements 













minors, it does 









10 Test and validate 
10.15 Test 








 Organizations shall follow a 
defined quality change 
control and testing process 
(e.g., ITIL Service 
Management) with 
established baselines, testing, 
and release standards that 
focus on system availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity 
of systems and services. 
1 > R N/A NA 
 
Not able to 
test this 
control due to 
resource 
limitations 
Note. Category applicability: R = required, O = recommended/optional consumer/organization. NF = no finding, O=open, NA =not applicable. 
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RIOTSS Assessment Findings 
The demonstration assessment of an Apple Watch 2 using RIOTSS was completed with 
findings documented and recorded. It is unknown if the Apple Watch 2 could comply with the 
rest of the controls due to the fact that it was not able to adhere to the controls analyzed. Apple 
has touted itself as one of the more secure devices on the market, but as the RIOTSS 
demonstration discovered, it did not adhere to several best practices, industry security measures, 
and/or standards and frameworks. Apple had several gaps uncovered while using open source 
materials. 
These findings helped to support and provide evidence for the need of corporations and 
organization to conduct security assessments and adhere to security frameworks. RIOTSS 
offered the ability to use one security framework to ensure IoT devices and products were 
produced in a secure manner and that hardening practices are integrated into the IoT 
environment. 
Apple Watch 2–RIOTSS Threat Space Test 
 This section reviewed the RIOTSS Apple Watch 2 assessment to determine if issues 
within the RIOTSS threat space were addressed. The following summarized threat space items: 
• hard-coded and weak passwords, 
• hard-coded usernames, 
• weak encryption standards, and 
• weak Bluetooth standards. 
Through the RIOTSS assessment, the Apple Watch 2 was found not to use a hard-coded 
password, which verified that RIOTSS threat space was mitigated. The assessment demonstrated 
that the Apple Watch 2 allowed users to apply insecure and weak passwords, which did not 
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mitigate the threat space. The Apple Watch 2 was encrypted, but it was unclear which encryption 
method was used, so it remains unknown if the device was able to mitigate this threat space 
event. The Apple Watch 2 used Bluetooth 4.0 rather than 4.2, which did not mitigate this threat 
space issue. Since the Apple Watch 2 was not able to completely mitigate all of the RIOTSS 
threat space issues, it did not pass the threat space test. Table 10 summarized these results. 
Table 10 Apple Watch 2 RIOTSS Threat Space Test Results 
Apple Watch 2  Mitigation of RIOTSS Threat Space 
  Yes No 
Hard code passwords X   
Weak passwords   X 
Weak encryption standard Unknown 
Weak Bluetooth standard   X 
 
RIOTSS Project Limitations 
During the RIOTSS research project and evaluation of the Apple Watch 2, several 
limitations were noted. One major limitation of importance during the assessment phase was that 
RIOTSS was developed for vendors and manufacturers, so any assessment was performed using 
a limited version of RIOTSS. Controls that were tested and verified were those that an average 
consumer could perform. 
Another limitation was that vulnerability software or software that could capture Wi-
Fi/Bluetooth communication was not included. These would have helped evaluate some of the 
controls. For the project, these types of issues included the use of open source material or were 
marked N/A and assigned to the manufacturer to complete. 
A further limitation was a lack of access to the vendor’s or manufacturer’s policies 
related to specific controls. If these could have been reviewed for conformity to existing controls, 
the Apple Watch 2 assessment could have included more controls. For the project, these types of 
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issues included the use of open source material or were marked N/A and assigned to the 
manufacturer to complete. 
One of the most significant limitations for this project was that evaluations were 
conducted by a single person. Because of this, it is possible key points may have been 
overlooked. Some controls might have been better suited to other security enhancements. To 
address this potential, many different standards and frameworks were analyzed from a wide 
variety of industries to ensure no control was left out of RIOTSS. 
Within this research, thesis statement one was not validated because of a design change 
in the RIOTSS framework. The design change moved the testing from being performed by an 
assessor to being conducted by the vendor and/or manufacturer. 
RIOTSS Conclusion 
RIOTSS was able to determine gaps and weaknesses within the subset of standards and 
frameworks in use, which proved the hypothesis that one existing standard or framework was not 
able to properly secure IoT devices was correct. This new framework was developed to meet the 
specific security needs of IoT devices using. With the development of RIOTSS, one framework 
could be used to assess and evaluate IoT devices to ensure proper security best practices were 
integrated. Given that this was the first draft of RIOTSS, there could be areas for improvement 
and streamlining. 
RIOTSS was used to conduct an assessment on an Apple Watch 2. Since RIOTSS was 
designed and developed for manufacturers, many controls could not be tested or reviewed. The 
limited access to the hardware, software, firmware, and actual vendor code to perform an 
assessment in the RIOTSS test lab reduced the level of evaluation on the Apple Watch 2. The 
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assessment of the Apple Watch 2 was based on open and public references, such as user guides, 
technological specifications, the EUA, and testing on a limited number of controls. 
Since a limited version of RIOTSS was used to conduct the Apple Watch 2 assessment, 
the following illustrates the number of controls evaluated and tested per section. 
• Section one, “Configuration,” reviewed 7 (1.2-1.5, 1.7, 1.29, and 1.41) of the 41 total 
controls for this section. 
• Section two, “Hardware,” reviewed 4 (2.34, 2.55, 2.58, and 2.59) of the 59 total controls 
for this section. 
• Section three, “Software and Mobile Apps,” reviewed 7 (3.74-3.76, 3.78, 3.86, and 3.87) 
of the 90 total controls for this section. 
• Section four, “Operating System,” reviewed 5 (4.46-4.50) of the 50 total controls for this 
section. 
• Section five, “Encryption and Key Management,” reviewed 4 (5.3, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.13) of 
the 13 total controls for this section. 
• Section six, “A&A,” reviewed 10 (6.2, 6.3, 6.8, 6.14, 6.17, 6.19, 6.25, 6.26, 6.29 and 
6.30) of the 30 total controls for this section. 
• Section seven, “Network, Wi-Fi and Network Elements,” reviewed 5 (7.21, 7.22, 7.33, 
7.36 and 7.38) of the 38 total controls for this section. 
• Section eight, “Cloud and Web UI,” reviewed 3 (8.20, 8.57 and 8.66) of the 72 total 
controls for this section. 
• Section nine, “Privacy and Ownership Transfers,” reviewed 20 (9.2 -9.6 9.15, 9.18, 9.22, 
9.23, 9.25, 9.27, 9.28, 9.32, 9.35, 9.36, 9.39, 9.40, and 9.42-9.47) of the 47 total controls 
for this section. 
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• Section 10, “Test and Validation,” reviewed 0 of the 24 total controls for this section. 
Apple Watch 2 assessment demonstrated the value and flexibility of RIOTSS as an 
assessment tool, although vendors and manufacturers should implement RIOTSS fully during the 
IoT device lifecycle. This assessment also demonstrated RIOTSS protection for IoT devices to 
ensure they were properly secured and hardened. 
Figure 4, provides a visual representation of the Apple Watch 2 risk assessment. Both 
images provide the same data: Figure 4 shows each section within RIOTSS and the number of 
findings within each of those sections. The first image in Figure 4 is simple bar chart with the 
assessment finding on the vertical axis and the individual sections of RIOTSS on the horizontal 
axis. The assessment findings are scored as follows NA = 0, not a finding = 1 and open/finding = 
2, as the graph shows there is only one finding within three individual sections of RIOTSS that 
the Apple Watch 2 had as discovered. There were no other findings within the other sections of 
RIOTSS. 
 
Figure 4. Summary of the Apple Watch 2 risk assessment. 
Figure 5 is a star graph with the assessment finding individual circles and the individual sections 
of RIOTSS circle the outer most circle. The assessment findings are scored as follows NA = 0, 
not a finding = 1 and open/finding = 2, as the graph shows there was only one finding within 
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three individual sections of RIOTSS that the Apple Watch 2 had as discovered. There were no 
other findings within the other sections of RIOTSS. 
 
Figure 5. Summary of the Apple Watch 2 risk assessment. 
Figure 6 offers a visional comparison of what an Apple Watch 2 risk assessment bar chart 
would look like with no finding, which means that there were no security weakness or threat that 
were discovered during the risk assessment process. The vertical and horizontal axis are the same 
as Figure 5. Figure 6 results would only be possible if an actual assessment was conducted and 
there were no findings discovered during the assessment. Figure 6 is just a visual representation 
of what the finding from a secure device risk assessment bar chart would look like compared to 
Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Apple Watch 2 risk assessment with no findings. 
Figure 7 offers a visional comparison of what an Apple Watch 2 risk assessment bar chart 
would look like with finding, which means that there were security weakness and threat that 
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were discovered during the risk assessment process. The vertical and horizontal axis are the same 
as Figure 4. Figure 7 results would only be possible if an actual assessment was conduct and 
there were multiple findings discovered within each section during the assessment. Figure 7 is 
just a visual representation of what the finding from an insecure device risk assessment bar chart 
would look like compared to Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
 
Figure 7. Apple Watch 2 risk assessment with findings. 
Chapter Contribution Summary 
 The purpose of this section was to highlight and briefly discuss how this chapter was able 
to validate the thesis statement, support the project objectives, and prove that RIOTSS project 
offers a contribution to the research community. Within this chapter, thesis statements two and 
three were validated with the case study based on the risk assessment of the Apple Watch 2 
performed with RIOTSS assessment tool, implementing industry standards and IT security best 
practices to mitigation any risks discovered. 
This chapter supported objectives one to four via the development of the RIOTSS 
framework and an assessment of the Apple Watch 2 using the finalized version of RIOTSS. 
Additionally, a systematic process was created to assess IoT devices to increase security and data 
protection. Again, Chapter 7 is able to prove C1 because RIOTSS was used to perform a security 
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risk assessment on an Apple Watch 2, resulting in several findings that did not pass this security 
assessment that was conducted on this IoT device. These findings need to be mitigated by Apple 
and then retested to verify that the threats and risks were resolved and that no new threats or risks 
were introduced into the Apple Watch 2 environment. 
This chapter supports contribution two because RIOTSS is a security framework with 
controls that may be applied to increase security while maintaining the IoT device’s usability and 
flexibility. Also, contribution three was not supported merely because this chapter did not 
analyze gaps or weaknesses in various standards and frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 8. OBJECTIVE/CONTRIBUTION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Objective/Contribution Summary 
 To ensure that this research project was able to meet the objective discussed in Chapter 1, 
a quick review of these objective is in order. Below are the objectives that this research project 
set out to accomplish: 
• constructed a standardized framework that allows for uniformity and reusability when 
conducting security assessments and threat analyses, 
• this standardized framework provided this research project the ability to use resources 
more efficiently, 
• determined a process to increase security and data protection for IoT devices, including 
mitigation of findings from security assessments and threat analyses, and 
• this objective also addressed methods to increase the security level of IoT devices 
through data encryption, secure network connections, best practices, and industry 
standards. 
This research project has successfully met the objectives discussed by creating a security 
framework that is uniform and reusable during security risk assessment and threat analysis, along 
with RIOTSS offers methods to increase efficient use of resources while offering mitigation 
methods that adhere to industry standards and security best practices including data protection 
through encryption and network security. 
To determine if this research project offers a contribution within this area of study, a 
quick review of the contributions that were discussed within Chapter 1 is in order. Below are the 
contributions that this research project set out to accomplish: 
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• offers vendors and manufactures of IoT devices a method to ensure that IoT devices are 
properly patched and current security protocols are integrated into the IoT devices before 
being released, 
• offers a method for IoT devices to be evaluated to determine if these IoT devices are 
properly hardened and have integrated security best practices prior to being release, and 
• offers a method of determining if threats and weaknesses were properly mitigated during 
the production of IoT devices with the use of RIOTSS framework. 
This research project offers a contribution to this area of study because RIOTSS is a 
security framework that allows a method for vendors and manufactures to patch these IoT 
devices properly, to assess the security matrix, and offers controls for mitigation that can be 
applied to increase the IoT devices hardening to increase security while maintaining the IoT 
device’s usability and flexibility. Also, contributions two and three were verified during the risk 
assessment of the Apple Watch 2 to determine if Apple was using industry standards and 
security best practices during the production of the Apple Watch 2. This research project also 
was able to conduct a gap analysis for gaps or weaknesses within various security standards and 
frameworks currently being used for risk assessment within this industry. 
Future Work—Next Release/Version 
 RIOTSS was designed to assess and evaluate the security of the IoT devices and 
attributes directly related to the security of IoT devices—the non-highlight items in Table 7. 
Failure to address these dramatically reduced the security of IoT devices and decreased data, and 
consumer privacy. These nine classifications were at the core of RIOTSS to ensure IoT devices 
and consumers were adequately protected and used current standards, best practices, and security 
methods. 
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 The next phase of RIOTSS includes assessment and evaluation of areas that indirectly 
increase the security of IoT devices. This can be divided into two parts, with the first part 
analyzing the indirect IoT device lifecycle, which includes the three highlighted groups from 
Table 8. The goal was to ensure that the supply chain used proper security standards and 
materials that could be tracked and accounted for and that vendors and manufacturers were 
provided security AT and updated security-related education. This incorporates and implements 
controls for some of the indirect functions that affect the overall security of IoT devices and 
consumers, some of which are part of the highlighted groups from Table 8. The second part 
reviewed consumer/end-user education and AT surrounding security, privacy, and personal 
information. 
Phase two of RIOTSS incorporated: 
 lifecycle, 
 secure supply chain, 
 business security processes and responsibility, 
 physical security, and 
 inside threat and end-user AT. 
By incorporating these categories into phase two, RIOTSS could determine if the 
organization would be required to perform these controls or if these would be optional. The 
current version of RIOTSS does not include organizational checks, which are marked N/A. The 
current RIOTSS version is only used for consumer-based applications. Phase two incorporates 
controls excluded during phase one of RIOTSS. 
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Lessons Learned 
 Through this work, lessons were learned that allowed an opportunity for growth. Some of 
the lessons learned are listed, as well as some suggestions for the future: 
• A prior determination of risks and pitfalls may have allowed for a successful framework 
earlier in the process. 
• Provision of a detailed email request when emailing organizations regarding the use of 
their work, as well as offering to sign a non-disclosure agreement, would have proven 
more time effective. 
• Standards/frameworks were modified, revised, and updated during this research project, 
so the starting point needed to be reevaluated to determine if NIST 800-53 was still a 
valid standard from which to start. NIST 800-53rev4 was determined to be the optimal 
standard to use. 
• During the project, it was discovered that NIST 800-181 or NIST 800-171 might have 
been well suited for this project. NIST 800-171 is a light version of NIST 800-53, and 
NIST 800-181 was developed to apply in the public, private, and academic sectors. If 
either of these two frameworks had been used as the foundation, the base control list 
would have been shorter. 
• Before completion of the RIOTSS demonstration assessment on Apple Watch 2, a 
perception that most of the control would be evaluated and found not applicable existed. 
It was surprising to discover that close to 100 of the 540 controls were able to be 
evaluated and tested. 
• The overall period to complete this project was too long and kept getting pushed back, 
with most of the delays outside dependent on third-party priorities and schedules. The 
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ability to be open and flexible with the completion date of this project, when this project 
was first discussed it had a completion date of December 2017, helped ensure the project 
would be a success and widely accepted as a doctoral-quality work. 
RIOTSS Conclusions 
 RIOTSS is still under development and continues to increase the security posture of IoT 
devices with each revision. RIOTSS continues to be a significant framework and assessment tool 
for IoT devices. There are numerous standards and frameworks that could be used to conduct a 
security and risk assessment of IoT devices, but none of these standards and frameworks offered 
a complete solution. RIOTSS offered a framework that addressed gaps and weaknesses to deliver 
a one-stop IoT device assessment tool. 
 This project reviewed and analyzed several standards and frameworks to create a 
framework distinctively designed for the uniqueness of IoT devices. RIOTSS addressed the 
extraordinary characteristics of IoT devices without exposing other functions to risks and threats 
or creating a device so secure it was unusable. The development of RIOTSS would not have 
been possible without the background work analyzing the various standards and frameworks to 
determine the gaps and weaknesses of each. Determining the gaps and weaknesses helped ensure 
RIOTSS incorporated these findings. 
Being flexible with the design and format of RIOTSS was important, as the original 
concept of RIOTSS was based on a scoring system with an inherent qualitative research 
attribute. Moving to the current format of required or recommended options for implementing 
controls removed some of the qualitative aspects from this process. The RIOTSS framework, 
like most of standards and frameworks, used a voting process to determine which controls would 
be required and which would be recommended. Table 11 is a visual representation of where 
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RIOTSS validates the project thesis statements, supports project objectives, and shows project 
contributions. 
Table 11 RIOTSS Summary 
  Ch 4 Ch 5 Ch 6 Ch 7 Ch 8 Ch 9 
TS 1 N/A N/A N/At N/A N/A N/A 
TS 2 X X X X X N/A 
TS 3 X X X X X N/A 
O 1 X X X X Not met N/A 
O 2 X X X X X N/A 
O 3 X X X X X N/A 
C 1 N/A X X X X N/A 
C 2 N/A Not met Not met Not met Not met N/A 
C 3 N/A Not met X X Not met N/A 
Note. Thesis statement (TS), objective (O) and contribution (C).  
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APPENDIX A. PRIOR STUDY  
Prior study was conducted to help create a foundation for this work and to determine if 
this project produced a dissertation-research-level work; this preliminary study was conducted as 
a proof of concept project. Within this prior work, three questions were posed regarding 
wearable technology security: 
1. Was the pairing key transmitted in the clear? 
2. Was Bluetooth traffic transmitted in the clear? 
3. Could a MITMA take place? 
Prior Study Background 
The concept for this previous project was based on two similar Bluetooth security 
projects; one was conducted at MIT and was the focus of earlier work on Fitbit Bluetooth 
security. The second was a white paper that analyzed security risks and vulnerabilities in medical 
devices using Bluetooth to transmit data. The literature review helped build the knowledge and 
understanding for this project and determined why this topic was important to research. 
Wearable Technology Vulnerabilities 
Wearable technology has numerous vulnerabilities; one of the security concerns when 
using IoT devices is the risk of threats that can affect these devices. Table A1 lists several 
vulnerabilities. These are potential threats to IoT devices and increase the risk of using wearable 
technology if not adequately mitigated. 
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Table A1 List of Vulnerabilities of Wearable Technology 
Vulnerabilities of Wearable Technology 
Cleartext login information Cleartext HTTP data processing 
Denial of service Battery drain attack 
Mule attacks MITMAs 
Data injection Eavesdropping and data capture 
Insecure data storage Inference attacks 
Malware Ensure mobile apps 
No authentication External and internal attacks 
Wearable Technology Security Weaknesses 
Wearable technology has numerous weaknesses due to the number of functions and 
features that are incorporated, with Bluetooth technology being one of the most common features 
implemented. Bluetooth has a wide array of weaknesses that can reduce the security of these 
devices. Table A2 lists several attacks that can be used to hack and gain access to Bluetooth-
enabled devices. Some of these attacks can be used on IoT devices if not properly secured. 
Table A2 List of Security Weaknesses with Bluetooth Technology 
Security Weaknesses with Bluetooth Technology 
Bluejacking Bluebugging 
Bluetooth worms Bluetooth fuzzing attacks 
Bluesnarfing Data corruption 
Key exchange and pairing Eavesdropping and spoofing 
Short PIN Repeated encryption keystream 
Passkey MITMA Repeated authentication attempts 
Weak encryption Simple shared-key authentication 
 
A literature review uncovered several vulnerabilities within each type of wearable 
technology analyzed. With wearable technology gaining popularity, an increasing number of 
consumers are purchasing these devices. Wearable technology is being adopted by industry and 
other markets. This increase in connectivity provides a greater presence of these devices within 
IoT, which further increases the risk associated with using these devices. 
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Because of this, security and privacy should be significant concerns with any emerging 
devices, based on current wearable technology, particularly given the amount and type of data 
that these devices acquire, store, and transmit. Emerging wearable devices have more capabilities 
and functions allowing the device to track and send health data, store appointment and contact 
information, receive text and email messages, and utilize the location services. A breach in any 
of the previous individual areas could pose a severe PII concern, and the risk of the aggregate 
data being accessed could become a significant risk to personal and institutional security. 
As current research in this area continues to increase with the boom of wearable 
technology, research in this area needs to continue. Further needs for focus recommended 
included Bluetooth security, data transmission, and firmware vulnerabilities. These are addressed 
in this research as well. 
Test Lab Configuration for Prior Study 
The Microsoft Band 2 fitness tracking device was the subject of a prior project. This 
device offered the standard fitness monitoring capability and allowed users to receive email 
message notifications, calendar alerts, text messages, and location services. The prior project was 
conducted in a controlled network lab environment; the required tools to complete this study 
project are in Table A3. 
Table A3 Required Items for the Prior Test Environment 
Required items for the prior test environment 
Microsoft Band 2 fitness tracker Microsoft Band 2 mobile application 
Mobile device (Apple iPhone 5 used) Laptop with supporting software 
Perytons Bluetooth smart protocol analyzer Peach Fuzz and Retina 
 
106 
Figure A1 shows the configuration of the test lab including the components listed in 
Table A3. This illustrates data being captured using a MITMA over a Bluetooth connection or 
Wi-Fi network. 
 
Figure A1. Test lab configuration. 
Data Capture 
The next stage of the early study was to investigate eavesdropping, data capture, and 
MITMAs on wearable technology. The early project also investigated attacks on key exchange, 
pairing, weak encryption, passkey, and MITMA within Bluetooth technology. In reviewing the 
results from [11], one could see that a MITMA could be successfully conducted; with the pairing 
code and encryption keys discovered, recovered, and decrypted; which allowed for the wearable 
device’s private data to be intercepted. Mitigation for these threats utilized industry best security 
practices and procedures and suggested the provision of user awareness training. This paper also 
suggested an increased length of the pairing key from a standard 6 to 8 or 16 characters with a 
combination of alphanumeric characters that would reduce the success of a brute force attack. 
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These security features could prevent and/or limit security risks within fitness tracking 
technology. 
 To verify fitness device security against the various vulnerabilities and threats that target 
wearable and Bluetooth devices, it was suggested that other areas could permit hackers access to 
the data to be analyzed and investigated. These areas of security concern included security risks 
for the iPhone 802.11 wireless firmware and protocol, Bluetooth protocol, and the application 
software. Bluetooth protocol within the fitness tracking device could be affected by the same 
vulnerabilities and threats. 
Prior Study Preliminary Results 
The findings and results of this prior preliminary work were that the Bluetooth pairing 
code was sent encrypted due to the red lock in the menu bar. Once the data were captured and 
saved, the process of trying to discover the pairing key and encryption key could proceed. The 
pairing code used between the iPhone and Microsoft Band 2 was captured. The Bluetooth pairing 
code discovered by Perytons Bluetooth smart protocol analyzer (BSPA) was also captured. This 
study determined that the Microsoft Band 2 device used encryption during the pairing process 
and data transmission. This project was able to answer the study questions that a bad actor could 
conduct a successful MITMA. The prior study objectives were reviewed, and three main points 
of this project were found: 
1. Wearable technology compromised security prior to release. 
2. The pairing code and encryption key were recoverable. 






APPENDIX B. RIOTSS FRAMEWORK 
 Table B1 is the complete RIOTSS security risk assessment that vendors or manufacturers would use to conduct an assessment 
on IoT devices. 
Table B1 RIOTSS Framework 
Sections 
Organization 










               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
Section 1 - Configuration 
1  -   
Configuration 
DoD IA Configuration DoD STIGS 
Security Technical Implementation 
Guides (STIGs) are the configuration 
standards for DOD IA and IA-enabled 
devices/systems. A process to hardened 
wide varioty of Applications, Appliances,  
Devices and OS   
1  > R 
    
1  -   
Configuration 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Security – Device,  
Apps and Cloud  
Services 
1 
 Disclose whether the device is capable 
of receiving security related updates, 
and if yes, disclose if the device can 
receive security 
updates automatically and what user 
action is required to ensure the device 
is updated correctly and in a timely 
fashion. 
1  > R 













Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category 
Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  
( O ) 
     Consumers  |  
Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1  -   
Configuration 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Security – Device,  
Apps and Cloud  
Services 
6 
 Ensure a mechanism is in place for 
automated safe and secure methods to 
provide software and/or firmware 
updates, patches and revisions. Such 
updates must either be signed and/or 
otherwise verified as coming from a 
trusted source, including but not 
limited to signing and integrity 
checking 
1  > R 
    
1  -   
Configuration 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Security – Device,  
Apps and Cloud  
Services 
7 
 Updates and patches must not modify 
user-configured preferences, security, 
and/or privacy settings without user 
notification. In cases where the device 
firmware or software is overwritten, 
on first use the user must be provided 
the ability to review and select privacy 
settings. 
1  > R 













Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1  -   
Configuration 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Security – Device,  
Apps and Cloud  
Services 
8 
 Security update process must disclose 
if they are Automated (vs automatic). 
Automated updates provide users the 
ability to approve, authorize or reject 
updates. In certain cases a user may 
want the ability to decide how and 
when the updates are made, including 
but not limited to data consumption 
and connection through their mobile 
carrier or ISP connection. Conversely, 
automatic updates are pushed to the 
device seamlessly without user 
interaction and may or may not 
provide user notice. 
1  > R 
















Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1  -   
Configuration 




The information system uses 
[Assignment: organization-defined 
security attributes] associated with 
[Assignment: organization-defined 
information, source, and destination 
objects] to enforce [Assignment: 
organization-defined information flow 
control policies] as a basis for flow 
control decisions. 
1  > R 
    
1  -   
Configuration 




Enforces a limit of [Assignment: 
organization-defined number] 
consecutive invalid logon attempts by 
a user during a [Assignment:  
organization-defined time period]; and 
1  > R 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 




AUDIT, AND RISK  
MANAGEMENT 
AR-7 Privacy-Enhanced 
System Design and 
Development 
The organization designs information 
systems to support 
 privacy by automating privacy 
controls 
      









Assesses the security controls in the 
information system and its 
environment of operation  
[Assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] to determine the extent to 
which the controls are implemented 
correctly, operating as intended, and 
producing the desired outcome with 
respect to meeting established security 
requirements; 
1  > R 
    




ASSESSMENT AND  
AUTHORIZATION 
CA-2 (1) INDEPENDENT  
ASSESSORS 
The organization employs assessors or 
assessment teams with  
[Assignment: organization-defined 
level of independence] to conduct 
security control assessments. 
      






CA-2 (3) EXTERNAL  
ORGANIZATIONS 
The organization accepts the results of 
an assessment of [Assignment: 
organization-defined information 
system] performed by when the 
assessment meets [Assignment: 
organization defined requirements]. 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 








The organization develops, 
documents, and maintains under 
configuration control, a current 
baseline configuration of the 
information system. 
      







AND TEST  
ENVIRONMENTS 
Development and test environments 
that is managed separately from the 
operational baseline configuration. 
      









Document any configuration and 
Implements approved 
configurationcontrolled changes to the 
information system; 
      
1  -   




Is consistent with the organization's 
enterprise architecture; 
      
1  -   
Configuration NIST 800-53rev4 PLANNING 
PL-8 INFORMATION  
SECURITY  
ARCHITECTURE 
Develops an information security 
architecture for the information system 
that: 
      





PM-14 TESTING,  
TRAINING, AND  
MONITORING 
Implements a process for ensuring that 
organizational plans for conducting 
security test, train, and monitor of IS 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1.1 
Configuration NIST 800-53rev4 
PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT 
PM-5 INFORMATION  
SYSTEM  
INVENTORY 
The organization develops and 
maintains an inventory of its 
information systems. 
1  > O 
    






SA-15 (6) CONTINUOUS  
IMPROVEMENT 
The organization requires the 
developer of the information system, 
system component, or information 
system service to implement an 
explicit process to continuously 
improve the development process. 
      






SA-18 TAMPER  
RESISTANCE AND  
DETECTION 
The organization implements a tamper 
protection program for the information 
system, system component, or 
information system service. 
      






SA-3 SYSTEM  
DEVELOPMENT  
LIFE CYCLE 
Manages the information system using 
[Assignment: organizationdefined 
system development life cycle] that 
incorporates information security 
considerations; 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 






SA-4 (2) DESIGN /  
IMPLEMENTATIO 
N INFORMATION  
FOR SECURITY  
CONTROLS 
The organization requires the 
developer of the information system, 
system component, or information 
system service to provide design and 
implementation information for the 
security controls to be employed that 
includes: [Selection (one or more): 
security-relevant external system 
interfaces; high-level design; lowlevel 
design; source code or hardware 
schematics; [Assignment:  
organization-defined  
design/implementation information]] 
at [Assignment: organization-defined 
level of detail]. 
      






SA-8 SECURITY  
ENGINEERING 
PRINCIPLES 
The organization applies information 
system security engineering principles 
in the specification, design, 
development, implementation, and 
modification of the information 
system. 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1  -   
Configuration 
NIST 800-53rev4 
SYSTEM AND  
COMMUNICATION 
S PROTECTION 
SC-3 (5) LAYERED  
STRUCTURES 
The organization implements security 
functions as a layered structure 
minimizing interactions between 
layers of the design and avoiding any 
dependence by lower layers on the 
functionality or correctness of higher 
layers. 
      
1  -   
Configuration 
NIST 800-53rev4 
SYSTEM AND  
COMMUNICATION 
S PROTECTION 
SC-5 DENIAL OF  
SERVICE  
PROTECTION 
The information system protects 
against or limits the effects of the 
following types of denial of service 
attacks: by employing [Assignment: 
organization-defined security 
safeguards]. 
      
1  -   
Configuration 
NIST 800-53rev4 
SYSTEM AND  
INFORMATION  
INTEGRITY 
SI-16 MEMORY  
PROTECTION 
The information system implements 
[Assignment: organization-defined 
security safeguards] to protect its 
memory from unauthorized code 
execution. 
      
1  -   
Configuration NIST 800-53rev4 
SYSTEM AND  
INFORMATION  
INTEGRITY 
SI-3 (2) AUTOMATIC  
UPDATES 
The information system automatically 
updates malicious code protection 
mechanisms. 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
1  -   
Configuration 
NIST 800-53rev4 
SYSTEM AND  
INFORMATION  
INTEGRITY 
SI-7 (1) INTEGRITY  
CHECKS 
The information system performs an 
integrity check of [Assignment: 
organization-defined software, 
firmware, and information] [Selection 
(one or more): at startup; at 
[Assignment: organization-defined 
transitional states or securityrelevant 
events]; [Assignment: organization-
defined frequency]]. 
      






The configuration of the device and any 
related web services is tamper resistant. 
i.e. sensitive configuration parameters 
should only be changeable by authorised 
people (evidence should list the 
parameters and who is  uthorised to 
change). 
1  > R 
    






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.10 
 A security threat and risk assessment 
shall have been carried out using a 
standard methodology such as Octave 
or NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 1 Risk 
Management Framework [ref 35] to 
determine the risks and evolving 
threats.  
1  > R 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 




Business Security  




As part of the Security Policy develop 
security advisory notification steps. 
      





Business Security  




The Security Policy shall be compliant 
with a security framework / standard 1  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.17 
 Where real-time or up-time 
expectations are present, a mechanism 
must be present for notifying 
connected components of impending 
downtime for updates. 
1  > O 
    









 Responsibility is allocated for each 
stage of the update/updating lifecycle 1  > O 









Responsibility is allocated for control of 
the update process 2  > O 





Business Security  




Where remote update is supported, plan 
for validating and updating updates on an 
ongoing or remedial basis. 
2  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  





Business Security  




The security update policy for devices 
with a constrained power source shall be 
assessed to balance the needs of 
maintaining the integrity and availability 
of the device.  
2  > O 
    





Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.3 
 There are documented business 
processes in place for security 1  > R 





Business Security  




The company follows industry standard 
cybersecurity recommendations  
2  > O 
  
UK Cyber Essentials 
NIST Cyber Security  
Framework 






Business Security  




A security policy has been established for 
addressing changes, such as  
vulnerabilities, that could impact security 
and affect or involve technology or 
components incorporated into theproduct 
or service provided. 
2  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.7 
 Processes and plans are in place based 
upon the IoTSF “Vulnerability 
Disclosure Guidelines” or a similar 
recognised process to deal with the 
identification of a security 
vulnerability or compromise when 
they occur. 
2 >  O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  




Infrastructure &  
Virtualization  
Security 




The availability, quality, and adequate 
capacity and resources shall be planned, 
prepared, and measured to deliver the 
required system performance in 
accordance with legal, statutory, and 
regulatory compliance obligations. 
Projections of future capacity 
requirements shall be made to mitigate the 
risk of system overload. 
1  > O 









IVS-05  Implementers shall ensure that the 
security vulnerability assessment tools 
or services accommodate the 
virtualization technologies used (e.g., 
virtualization aware). 
2  > O 
    
Section 2 - Hardware 
2.1 






The organization develops and 
maintains an inventory of its 
information systems. 
1  > O 







DCS-04  Authorization must be obtained prior 
to relocation or transfer of hardware, 
software, or data to an offsite 
premises. 
1  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
2.3 
Hardware NIST 800-53rev4 
AUDIT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
AU-9 (1) HARDWARE  
WRITE-ONCE  
MEDIA 
The information system writes audit 
trails to hardware-enforced, writeonce 
media. 
1  > O 











The product’s processor system has a 
measured irrevocable hardware Secure  
Boot process 
& 
Enabled by default 
2  > O 





Device Hardware & 
Physical Security 
  
In production device  the microcontroller / 
microprocessor(s) shall not allow the 
firmware to be read out of the products 
non volatile [FLASH] memory or where a 
separate non volatile memory device is 
used the contents shall be encrypted 
3  > O 





Device Hardware & 
Physical Security 
2.4.4.12  
Tamper Resistant measures have been 
used to reduce the attack surface 





Device Hardware & 
Physical Security 2.4.4.11 
 
Tamper Evident measures have been used 
to  indicate any interference to the 
assembly.  
2 > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.7 
 Processes and plans are in place based 
upon the IoTSF “Vulnerability 
Disclosure Guidelines” to deal with 
the identification of a security 
vulnerability or compromise when 
they occur. 
2 >  O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.23 
 The security update policy for devices 
with a constrained power source shall 
be assessed to balance the needs of 
maintaining the integrity and 
availability of the device.  
2  >  O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.22 
 Where remote update is supported, 
there is an established process/plan for 
validating and updating updates on an 
on-going or remedial basis. 
1  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.19 
 Responsibility is allocated for control 
of the update process 2  > O 










 Responsibility is allocated for each 
stage of the update/updating lifecycle 1  > O 
    








Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.1 
Software  







Assets must be classified in terms of 
business criticality, service-level 
expectations, and operational continuity 
requirements. A complete inventory of 
business-critical assets located at all sites 
and/or geographical locations and their 
usage over time shall be maintained and 
updated regularly, and assigned ownership 
by defined roles and responsibilities. 
1  > O 
    
3.2 
Software  
        & 
Mobile Apps 
CCMv3.0.1 






Implementers shall ensure that the 
security vulnerability assessment tools or 
services accommodate the virtualization 
technologies used (e.g., virtualization 
aware). 
2  > O 
    
3.3 
Software  









 Processes and plans are in place based 
upon the IoTSF “Vulnerability 
Disclosure Guidelines” or a similar 
recognised process to deal with the 
identification of a security 
vulnerability or compromise when 
they occur. 
2 >  O 
    
3.4Software  





Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.18 
 Responsibility is allocated for each 
stage of the update/updating lifecycle 
1  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.5 
Software  










Responsibility is allocated for control 
of the update process 
2  > O 
    
3.6 
Software  





Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.22 
 Where remote update is supported, 
there is an established process/plan for 
validating and updating updates on an 
on-going or remedial basis. 
1  > O 
    
3.7 
Software  





Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.23 
 The security update policy for devices 
with a constrained power source shall 
be assessed to balance the needs of 
maintaining the integrity and 
availability of the device.  
2  >  O 
    
3.8 
Software  





Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.25 
 Where remote software upgrade can be 
supported by the device, there should 
be a published transparent and 
auditable policy and schedule of 
actions to fix any vulnerabilities found 
1  > O 
    
3.9 
Software  
       & 








Tamper Resistant measures have been 
used to reduce the attack surface 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.10 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.5 
 
If the product has any port(s) that are not 
required for normal operation, they are 
only allowed to communicate with 
authorised and authenticated entities or 
securely disabled when shipped. 
Where a port is used for field diagnostics, 
the port input is deactivated and the 
output provides no information which 
could compromise the device 
2  >  O 
    
3.11 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.6 
 
To prevent the stalling or disruption of the 
devices software operation any watchdog 
timers for this purpose cannot be disabled. 
2  > O 
    
3.12 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.7 
 
The product’s software signing root of 
trust is stored in tamper-resistant memory. 
2  > O 
    
3.13 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.9 
 
The cryptographic key chain used for 
signing production software is different 
from that used for any other test, 
development or other software images,  
to prevent the installation of  
onproduction software onto production 
devices. 
2  > O 
    
3.14 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.10 
 
Production software images should be 
assessed on release to remove all 
unnecessary debug and symbolic 
information. 
2  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.15 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.11 
 
Development software versions have any 
debug functionality switched off if the 
software is operated on the product 
outside of the product vendors’ trusted 
environment. 
2  > O 
    
3.16 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.12 
 
Steps have been taken to protect the 
products’ software from information 
leakage and sidechannel attacks 
2  > O 
    
3.17 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.13 
 
The product’s software source code 
follows the basic good practice of a 
Language subset (e.g. MISRA-C) coding 
standard. 
2  > O 
    
3.18 
Software  
        & 
 Mobile Apps 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 
Device Software 2.4.5.14 
 
The product’s software source code 
follows the basic good practice of static 
vulnerability analysis. 
2 > O 
    
3.19 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.15 
 
The software must be arhitected to 
identify and ring fence sensitive software  
components, including cryptographic 
processes, to aid inspection, review and 
test. The access from other software 
components must be controlled and 
restricted to known and acceptable 
operations. For example security related 
processes should be executed at higher 
privilege levels in the  
application processor hardware. 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.20 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.17 
 
Software source code is developed, tested 
and maintained following defined 
repeatable processes. 
2  > O 
    
3.21 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.18 
 
The build environment and toolchain used 
to create the software is under 
configuration management and version 
control, and its integrity is validated 
regularly. 
2  > O 
    
3.22 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.19 
 
The production software signing keys are 
under access control 
2  > O 
    
3.23 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.21 
 
Where the device software 
communicates with a product related 
webserver or application over TCP/ IP 
or UDP/IP, the device software uses 
certificate pinning or public/private key 
equivalent, where appropriate. 
2  > O 
    
3.24 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.23 
 
All inputs and outputs are checked for 
validity. E.g. use “Fuzzing” tests to check 
for acceptable responses or output ed 
(invalid) input stimuli. 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.25 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.24 
 
The software has been designed to fail 
safely, i.e. in the case of unexpected 
invalid inputs, or erroneous software 
operation, the product does not become 
dangerous, or compromise security of 
other connected systems. 
2  > O 
    
3.26 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.25 
 
Support for partially installing updates is 
provided for devices whose on-time is 
insufficient for the complete installation 
of a whole update 
2  > O 
    
3.2 7Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.26 
 
Support for partially downloading updates 
is provided for devices whose network 
access is limited or sporadic. 
1  > O 
    
3.28 
Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.27 
 
Where real-time expectations of 
performance are present, update 
mechanisms must not interfere with 
meeting these expectations (e.g. by 
running update processes at low priority). 
1 > O 
    
3.29 Software  




Device Software 2.4.5.28 
 
Where a device doesn’t support Secure 
Boot, user data and secrets must be erased 
when a firmware update is installed. 
1   > O 
    
3.30 Software  





PM-5 INFORMATION  
SYSTEM  
INVENTORY 
The organization develops and 
maintains an inventory of its 
information systems. 
1  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
3.31 
Software  








Authorization must be obtained prior to 
relocation or transfer of software, or data 
to an offsite premises. 
1  > O 
    
3.32 
Software  
       & 
Mobile Apps 
CCMv3.0.1 
Security Incident  
Management, E- 






Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting business 
processes and technical measures 
implemented, to triage security-related 
events and ensure timely and thorough 
incident management, as per established 
IT service management policies and 
procedures. 
1  > O 
    
3.1 
Software  




Mobile Application 2.4.11.3 
 
The mobile application ensures that any 
related databases or files are either tamper 
resistant or restricted in their  
access. Upon detection of 
tampering of the databases or files they 
are reinitialised. 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 






DCS-01  Assets must be classified in terms of 
business criticality, service-level 
expectations, and operational 
continuity requirements. A complete 
inventory of business-critical assets 
located at all sites and/or geographical 
locations and their usage over time 
shall be maintained and updated 
regularly, and assigned ownership by 
defined roles and responsibilities. 
1  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.7 
 Processes and plans are in place based 
upon the IoTSF “Vulnerability 
Disclosure Guidelines” or a similar  
recognised process to deal with the 
identification of a security 
vulnerability or compromise when 
they occur. 
2 >  O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.17 
 Where real-time or up-time 
expectations are present, a mechanism 
must be present for notifying 
connected components of impending 
downtime for updates. 
1  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.18 
 Responsibility is allocated for each 
stage of the update/updating lifecycle 1  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.19 
 Responsibility is allocated for control 
of the update process 2  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.22 
 Where remote update is supported, 
there is an established process/plan for 
validating and updating updates on an 
on-going or remedial basis. 
1  > O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.23 
 The security update policy for devices 
with a constrained power source shall 
be assessed to balance the needs of 
maintaining the integrity and 
availability of the device.  
2  >  O 






Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.25 
 Where remote software upgrade can 
supported by the device, there should 
be a published/transparent and 
auditable policy and schedule of 
actions to fix any vulnerabilities 
found 
1  > O 





Device Hardware &  
Physical Security 
2.4.4.12  
Tamper Resistant measures have been 
used to reduce the attack surface 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  








The operating system is implemented with 
the most current patches prior to release. 









Where remote update is supported, there 
is an established process/plan for 
validating and updating patches on an 
ongoing or remedial basis. 
2  > O 








All interactive operating system accounts 
or logins have been disabled or eliminated 
from the software. 
2  > O 








Files and directories are set to appropriate 
access privileges on a need to access 
basis. 
2  > O 








Passwords file(s) are owned by and are 
only accessible to and writable by the 
Devices’ OS’s most privileged account 
2  > O 








All OS command line access to the most 
privileged accounts has been removed 
from the OS. 
2  > O 









The product’s OS kernel and its functions 
are prevented from being called by 
external produc level interfaces and 
unauthorised applications 
2  > O 
    


















Ref ID Seq 
# 
Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
5.1 
Encrypt  
     &  
Key Mgnt 
CCMv3.0.1 
Encryption & Key  
Management 
Sensitive Data  
Protection 
EKM-03  Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting business 
processes and technical measures 
implemented, for the use of encryption 
protocols for protection of sensitive 
data in storage (e.g., file servers, 
databases, and end-user workstations), 
data in use (memory), and data in 
transmission (e.g., system interfaces, 
over public networks, and electronic 
messaging) as per applicable legal, 
statutory, and regulatory compliance 
obligations. 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq 
# 
Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  Mitigation Method  Comments 
5.2 
Encrypt  
     &  
Key Mgnt 
CCMv3.0.1 
Encryption & Key 
Management 
Storage and Access 
EKM-04  Platform and data-appropriate 
encryption (e.g., AES-256) in 
open/validated formats and standard 
algorithms shall be required. Keys 
shall not be stored in the cloud (i.e., at 
the cloud provider in question), but 
maintained by the cloud consumer or 
trusted key management provider. Key 
management and key usage shall be 
separated duties. 
2  > O 
    
5.3 
Encrypt  





Encryption and Key  
Management for  
Hardware 
2.4.9.1 
 A true random number generator 
source is exclusively used for all 
relevant cryptographic operations 
including nonce, initialisation vector 
and key generation algorithms. 
2  > O 
  
 use NIST SP 800-90A for 









Encryption and Key  
Management for  
Hardware 
2.4.9.2 
 The true random number generator 
source has been validated for true 
randomness  
2  > O 
  
using an NIST SP800-22 
[ref 4], FIPS 140-2 [ref 5] 









Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
5.5 
Encrypt  





Encryption and Key  
Management for  
Hardware 
2.4.9.3 
 There is a process for secure 
provisioning of keys that includes 
generation, distribution, revocation 
and destruction.  
2  > 
 
O 
  in compliance with 
FIPS140- 










Encryption and Key  
Management for  
Hardware 
2.4.9.4 
 There is a secure method of key 
insertion that protects keys against 
copying. 
2  > 
 
O 
    
5.6  
Encrypt  





Encryption and Key  
Management for  
Hardware 
2.4.9.9 
 In device manufacture all asymmetric 
encryption private keys that are 
unique to each device and truly 
randomly internally generated or 
securely programmed into each 
device 




are secured in accordance 
with FIPS 140-2 [ref 5]  
 
Authentication & Authorization  
 
 6.1 




IA-2 (10) SINGLE SIGN-ON The information system provides a 
single sign-on capability for 1  > 
 
O 
    
6.2  A  




IA-5 AUTHENTICATOR  
MANAGEMENT 
The ablity to change default content of 
authenticators prior 1  > 
 
O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # 
Title 
Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  









IA-5 (1) PASSWORDBASED  
AUTHENTICATION 
Enforces password minimum and 
maximum lifetime restrictions for 
defined numbers for lifetime 
minimum, lifetime maximum 
1  > 
 
O 
    
 6.4 





IA-5 (1) PASSWORDBASED  
AUTHENTICATION 
Prohibits password reuse for defined 
number of generations  1  > 
 
O 
    
 6.5 







Authorization must be obtained prior to 
relocation or transfer of hardware, 
software, or data to an offsite premises. 1  > 
 
O 
   
Senor Leadership and & 
executive Level Manage 
authorization must be 
obtained 
End enders should be given  
notice  
 6.6 







The product contains a unique and 
tamper resistant device identifier (e.g. 
such as the chip serial number or other 
unique silicon identifier) which is used 
for  
binding code and data to a specific 
device hardware 
1  > 
 
O 
    
6.7 







The information system provides a  












Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               
Category 
Applicability 
Required  ( R) 
Recommended/ 
Optional  ( O ) 




Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
Section 7 - Network / Wi-Fi & Network Elements  
 
7.1 
Wired / Wi-Fi 
           & 
Ntwk elements  
CCMv3.0.1 
Infrastructure &  
Virtualization  
Security 




Higher levels of assurance are required 
for protection, retention, and lifecycle 
management of audit logs, adhering to 
applicable legal, statutory or regulatory 
compliance obligations and providing 
unique user access accountability to 
detect potentially suspicious network 
behaviors and/or file integrity anomalies, 
and to support forensic investigative 
capabilities in the event of a security 
breach. 
2  > 
 
O 
    
7.2   
Wired / Wi-Fi 
           & 








The product prevents unauthorised 
connections to it or other devices the 
product is connected to. For example, 
there is a firewall on each interface and 
internet layer protocol. 
2  > O 
    
7.3   
Wired / Wi-Fi 
           & 








Where there is a loss of communications, 
it shall not compromise the integrity of 
the device 
1  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
7.4   
Wired / Wi-Fi 
           & 








The product only enables the 
communications interfaces, network 
protocols, application protocols and 
network services necessary for the 
products’ operation. 
2  > O 
    
7.5   
Wired / Wi-Fi 
           & 








Post product launch communications 
protocols should be maintained to the 
most secure versions available and/or 
appropriate for the product 
2  > O 
    
Section 8 - Cloud and Web UI 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




DCS-01  Assets must be classified in terms of 
business criticality, service-level 
expectations, and operational 
continuity requirements. A complete 
inventory of business-critical assets 
located at all sites and/or geographical 
locations and their usage over time 
shall be maintained and updated 
regularly, and assigned ownership by 
defined roles and responsibilities. 
1  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 





DCS-04  Authorization must be obtained prior 
to relocation or transfer of hardware, 
software, or data to an offsite 
premises. 
1  > O 
   
Senor Leadership and & 
executive Level Manage 
authorization must be 
obtained End enders should 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommented / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  Mitagation Method  Comments 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
CCMv3.0.1 
Infrastructure &  
Virtualization  
Security 




Higher levels of assurance are required for 
protection, retention, and lifecycle 
management of audit logs, adhering to 
applicable legal, statutory or regulatory 
compliance obligations and providing 
unique user access accountability to detect 
potentially suspicious network behaviors 
and/or file integrity anomalies, and to 
support forensic investigative capabilities 
in the event of a security breach. 
2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
CCMv3.0.1 






Implementers shall ensure that the 
security vulnerability assessment tools or 
services accommodate the virtualization 
technologies used (e.g., virtualization 
aware). 
2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.7 
 Processes and plans are in place based 
upon the IoTSF “Vulnerability 
Disclosure Guidelines” or a similar 
recognised process to deal with the 
identification of a security 
vulnerability or compromise when 
they occur. 
2 >  O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
8  -  Cloud 
              & 




Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.17 
 Where real-time or up-time 
expectations are present, a mechanism 
must be present for notifying 
connected components of impending 
downtime for updates. 
1  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 








 Responsibility is allocated for each 
stage of the update/updating lifecycle 1  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.19 
 Responsibility is allocated for control 
of the update process 2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.22 
 Where remote update is supported, 
there is an established process/plan for 
validating and updating updates on an 
on-going or remedial basis. 
1  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




Business Security  
Processes and  
Responsibility 
2.4.3.23 
 The security update policy for devices 
with a constrained power source shall 
be assessed to balance the needs of 
maintaining the integrity and 
availability of the device.  
2  >  O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 




Device Hardware &  
Physical Security 2.4.4.12 
 Tamper Resistant measures have been 
used to reduce the attack surface 2  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recomended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 




All the product related cloud and network 
elements have the latest operating 
system(s) security updates implemented  
and processes are in place to keep them 
updated 
2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 




The product related web servers support 
appropriately secure TLS/DTLS ciphers 
and disable/remove support for deprecated 
ciphers. 
2  > O 
   
. For example those 
published at ENISA, SSL 
Labs & IETF RFC7525 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 




Where a product related to a webserver 
encrypts communications using TLS and 
requests a client certificate, the server(s) 
only establishes a connection if the client 
certificate and its chain of trust are valid 
2  > O 
   






certificate and public key 
pinning guidance 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 




Where a product related to a webserver 
encrypts communications using TLS, 
certificate pinning is implemented. 
2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 
Cloud and Network 
Elements 2.4.13.12 
 
The Cloud and Network elements follow 
the password requirements of section 
2.4.8. 
1  > O 








Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 








If run as a cloud service, the service meets 
industry standard cloud security principles 
2  > O 
  
Cloud Security Alliance,  
NIST Cyber Security  
Framework 
UK Government Cloud  
Security Principles  
 
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance Web User Interface 2.4.10.1 
 
 Where the product or service provides a 
web based interface, Strong 
Authentication is used 
2  > O 
    
8 -  Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 
Web User Interface 2.4.10.2 
 
Where the product or service provides a 
web based interface, public and restricted 
areas shall be separated for authentication 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  
 
Comments 
8 - Cloud 
              & 
       Web UI 
IOTSF Security 
Compliance 
Web User Interface 2.4.10.4 
 
Where a web user interface password is 
used for login authentication, the initial 
password or factory reset password is 
unique to each device in the product 
family. 
2  > O 
    
Section 9 - Privacy & Over transfers 
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
NIST 800-53rev4 MAINTENANCE 
MA-3 (2) INSPECT MEDIA The organization checks media 
containing diagnostic and test 
programs for malicious code before 
the media are used in the information 
system. 
1  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &   






Physically controls and securely stores  
1  > O 
   
organization-defined types 
of digital and/or non-digital 
media within organization 
defined controlled areas 
9 - Privacy   
          &   




MP-6 (8) REMOTE  
PURGING /  
WIPING OF  
INFORMATION 
The organization provides the 
capability to purge/wipe information 
from information systems, system 
components, or devices either locally, 
remotely or under the 
organizationdefined conditions 
1  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
a. Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
NIST 800-53rev4 TRANSPERANCY 
TR-2 System of Records  
Notices and  
Privacy Act  
Statements 
b. Publishes System of 
Records Notices (SORNs) in the 
Federal Register , subject to required 
oversight processes, for systems 
containing personally identifiable 
information (PII) 
c. Keeps SORNs  current 
d. Includes Privacy Act 
Statements on its forms that collect 
PII, or on separate forms that can be  
retained by individuals, to provide 
additional formal notice to individuals 
from whom the information is being 
collected 
2  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
NIST 800-53rev4 USE LIMITATION 
UL-1 Internal Use The organization uses personally 
identifiable information (PII) 
internally only for the authorized 
purpose(s) identified in the Privacy 
Act and/or in public notices. 
2  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 




Provide the ability to reset a device and 
application to factory settings, including 
the ability to erase user data in the event 
of transfer, rental, loss or sale. 
1  > O 








Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title 
Description Requirement 
Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O ) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitigation Method  Comments 
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Notifications &  




End-user communications, including but 
not limited to email and SMS, must adopt 
authentication protocols to help prevent 
spear phishing and spoofing. Domains  
should implement SPF, DKIM and 
DMARC for all security and privacy-
related communications and  
1  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &          
O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Notifications &  




IoT vendors using email communication 
should adopt transport-level 
confidentiality, including generally 
accepted security techniques to aid in 
securing communications and enhancing 
the privacy and integrity of the message 
(also referred to as “Opportunistic TLS 
for email”).7 
1  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Notifications &  




Implement measures to help prevent or 
make evident any physical tampering of 
devices. Such measures help to protect the 
device from being opened or modified for 
malicious purposes after installation or 
from being returned to a retailer in a 
compromised state 
1  > O 
    
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Notifications &  




Consider how to accommodate 
accessibility requirements for users who 
may be vision, hearing and or mobility 
impaired to maximize access for users of 
all physical capabilities 
1  > O 






Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommended / Optional  ( O 
) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  Mitigation Method  Comments 
9 -  Privacy   
          &   
        O T 
OTA IoT Trust 
Framework® v2.5 
Notifications &  




Develop communications processes to 
maximize user awareness of any potential 
security or privacy issues, endof life 
notifications and possible product recalls, 
including in-app notifications. 
Communications should be written 
maximizing comprehension for the 
general user’s reading level. Consider 
multi-lingual communications, 
recognizing that English may be the 
“second language”  
1  > O 
    
10  -  Test   
           &  







The information system implements a 
reference monitor that is tamperproof, 
always invoked, and small enough to 
be subject to analysis and testing, the 
completeness of which can be assured. 
2  > O 
   
organization-defined access 
control policies 
10  -  Test   
           &  
       Validate  
CCMv3.0.1 





IVS-05  Implementers shall ensure that the 
security vulnerability assessment tools 
or services accommodate the 
virtualization technologies used (e.g., 
virtualization aware). 
2  > O 







Table B1. (continued) 
Sections 




Ref ID Seq # Title Description Requirement Compliance Class 
               Category Applicability 
     Required  ( R )  
     Recommented / Optional  ( O 
) 
     Consumers  |  Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding NF = 
No Finding. 
O=Open 
NA =Not Applicable  
Mitagation Method  Comments 
10  -  Test   
           &  




Device Hardware &  
Physical Security 2.4.4.1 
 The product’s processor system has an 
irrevocable Secure Boot process 1  > O 
    
10  -  Test   
           &  
       Validate  
3  -  Software  
                & 






All inputs and outputs are checked for 
validity. E.g. use “Fuzzing” tests to check 
for acceptable responses or output for 
both expected (valid) andunexpected 
(invalid) input stimuli. 
2  > O 
   
10  -  Test   
           &  




Device Hardware &  
Physical Security 2.4.4.11 
 Tamper Evident measures have been 
used to  indicate any interference to the 
assembly.  
2 > O 
    
10  -  Test   
           &  




Device Hardware &  
Physical Security 2.4.4.12 
 Tamper Resistant measures have been 
used to reduce the attack surface 2  > O 








APPENDIX C. COMPLETED APPLE WATCH 2 RIOTSS ASSESSMENT 
Table C1 is the results from a security risk assessment from a Apple Watch2 using RIOTSS, this security risk assessment was 
conduct using information that a general user and consumer would have access to and information that is in the public space.  Any 
specific information or controls that would be only availability to the vend. or was marked N/A.    















    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 













Security –  




 Disclose whether 
the device can 
receive security 
related updates, 
and if yes, 





what user action 
is required to 
ensure the device 
is updated 
correctly and in a 
timely fashion. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 
































    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 




1.3    
Configuration 




Security –  




 Ensure a 














coming from a 
trusted source, 









that have been 
installed on 
this watch 
have met this 
this control 




updates to the 
watch  
1.4 Configuration 




Security –  




 Updates and 








cases where the 
device firmware 
or software is 
overwritten, on 
first use the user 
must be 
provided the 
ability to review 
and select 
privacy settings. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 
Updates and 




was tested and 
did not modify 





















    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 










Security –  




 Security update 
process must disclose 
if they are automated 
(vs automatic). 
Automated updates 
provide users the 
ability to approve, 
authorize or reject 
updates. In certain 
cases, a user may want 
the ability to decide 
how and when the 
updates are made, 
including but not 
limited to data 
consumption and 
connection through 
their mobile carrier or 
ISP connection. 
Conversely, automatic 
updates are pushed to 
the device seamlessly 
without user 
interaction and may or 
may not provide user 
notice. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 























invalid logon attempts 
by a user  
during a [Assignment: 
Organization defined 
time period]; and 
1  > R N/A NF 
 Did not test 
this control; 
did not want 
to lockout the 
user or myself 
User guide 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 












the device and 












who is authorized 
to change). 
















































Apple pay and 
the step Apple 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 














 Where the product 
has a hardware source 
for generating true 
random numbers, all 
cryptographic 
functions shall use 
this hardware source 
as the sole source of 
random numbers and 
nonces. 
1 > R N/A NF 















Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
8 
 Security update 
process must disclose 
if they are automated 
(vs automatic). 
Automated updates 
provide users the 
ability to approve, 
authorize or reject 
updates. In certain 
cases, a user may 
want the ability to 
decide how and when 
the updates are made, 
including but not 
limited to data 
consumption and 
connection through 
their mobile carrier 
or ISP connection. 
Conversely, 
automatic updates 
are pushed to the 
device seamlessly 
without user 
interaction and may 
or may not provide 
user notice. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 




updates can be 
installed 
automatically 
Not sure if 
Apple Updates 













Table C1. (continued) 
   
Sections 
Organization 











    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 












Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
6 
 Ensure a 














coming from a 
trusted source, 
including but not 
limited to signing 
and integrity 
checking 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 
to this control 
for Apple IOS 
and other 
products since 


















the device can 
receive security 
related updates, 
and if yes, 





what user action 
is required to 
ensure the device 
is updated 
correctly and in a 
timely fashion. 






EUA, not sure 
if this applies 









Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 









OTA IoT Trust 






 Disclose whether the 
device can receive 
security related updates, 
and if yes, disclose if the 
device can receive 
security updates 
automatically and what 
user action is required to 
ensure the device is 
updated correctly and in 
a timely fashion. 



















Software  & 
Mobile 
Apps 
OTA IoT Trust 












and best practices. All 
personally identifiable 
data in transit and in 
storage must be 
encrypted using current 
generally accepted 
security standards. This 
includes but is not 
limited to wired, Wi-Fi, 
and Bluetooth 
connections. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 
2 does not 
adhere to this 
control 
Apple Watch 
2 adheres to 
























    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 









OTA IoT Trust 







Ensure a mechanism  
is in place for automated 
safe and secure methods 
to provide software 
and/or firmware updates, 
patches and revisions. 
Such updates must either 
be signed and/or 
otherwise verified as 
coming from a trusted 
source, including but not 
limited to signing and 
integrity checking 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 
to this control 
for Apple IOS 
and other 
products since 












OTA IoT Trust 






 Security update process 
must disclose if they are 
automated (vs 
automatic). Automated 
updates provide users 
the ability to approve, 
authorize or reject 
updates. In certain 
cases, a user may want 
the ability to decide how 
and when the updates 
are made, including but 
not limited to data 
consumption and 
connection through their 
mobile carrier or ISP 
connection. Conversely, 
automatic updates are 
pushed to the device 
seamlessly without user 
interaction and may or 
may not provide user 
notice. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 




























    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 





















example see FIPS 
140-2 [ref 5] 
1 > R N/A NF 




















 Where passwords 
are entered on a 




default to prevent 
the capture of 
passwords 















Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 
















update policy for 
devices with a 
constrained 
power source 
shall be assessed 





the device.  
2 >  0 N/A NF 
 The watch 
needs to be 




for update to 
be applied and 
installed 
This control 
was tested to 
and can meet 













the device can 
receive security 
related updates, 
and if yes, 





what user action 
is required to 
ensure the device 
is updated 
correctly and in a 
timely fashion. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 














Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 















Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
2 












in transit and in 










1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 
2 does not 













Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
6 
 Ensure a 














coming from a 
trusted source, 
including but not 
limited to signing 
and integrity 
checking  
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 
to this control 

































    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 












Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
7 
 Updates and patches must 
not modify user 
configured preferences, 
security, and/or privacy 
settings without user 
notification. In cases 
where the device 
firmware or software is 
overwritten, on first use 
the user must be provided 
the ability to review and 
select privacy settings. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Updates and 




was tested and 
did not modify 









Device, Apps and 
Cloud Services 
8 
 Security update process 
must disclose if they are 
automated (vs 
automatic). Automated 
updates provide users the 
ability to approve, 
authorize or reject 
updates. In certain cases, 
a user may want the 
ability to decide how and 
when the updates are 
made, including but not 
limited to data 
consumption and 
connection through their 
mobile carrier or ISP 
connection. Conversely, 
automatic updates are 
pushed to the device 
seamlessly without user 
interaction and may or 
may not provide user 
notice. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 














Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 




5- Encryption & Key Mgnt 
5.3 

















be required. Keys 
shall not be 
stored in the 
cloud  
(i.e., at the cloud 
provider in 
question), but 
maintained by the 
cloud consumer 




key usage shall 
be separated 
duties. 






bit not the 
encryption 
type is not 
published or 
found on open 
source sites 













Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 














2.4.9.5  All the product 
related 
cryptographic 





and SHA-1 are 








bit not the 
encryption 
type is not 
published or 
found on open 
source sites 























secure for the 











bit not the 
encryption 
type is not 
published or 
found on open 
source sites 













Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 





Encrypt      
&  
Key Mgnt 




Security –  
















in transit and in 





includes but is 










bit not the 
encryption 
type is not 
published or 
found on open 
source sites 






6  -  Authentication  &  Authorization  (A  &  A) 
 6.2 
A  & A  
NIST 80053rev4 
Identification and  
Authentication 




a single sign on 
capability 
2 > R N/A NF 
 Apple other 
single sign on 
options with 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 









    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 






A  & A  
NIST 80053rev4 
Identification and  
Authentication 















IOS can be 
Jailed Broken, 
there is no 
mitigation that 
could prevent 



























Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 




Ref ID Seq # 
Title Description Requirement 
Compliance 
Class 
    Category 
Applicability 
R = Required    






NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 











IP-1 Consent The organization:  
a. Provides means, where 
feasible and appropriate, 
for individuals to 
authorize the collection, 
use, maintaining, and 
sharing of personally 
identifiable information 
(PII) prior to its  
collection; 
b. Provides appropriate 
means for individuals to 
understand the 
consequences of decisions 
to approve or decline the 
authorization of the 
collection, use, 
dissemination, and 
retention of PII; 
c. Obtains consent, where 
feasible and appropriate, 
from individuals prior to 
any new uses or 
disclosure of previously 
collected PII 
d. Ensures that individuals 
are aware of and, where 
feasible, consent to all 
uses of PII not initially 
described in the public 
notice that was in effect at 
the time the organization 
collected the PI 





you agree and 
give consent 
to collect and 
use data per 








Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 











    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations   
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 










Authentication and  
Authorization 
2.4.8.4  The product 
does not accept 
the use of null 
or blank 
passwords 









Since it allows 
this feature to 





















1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple device 
and product 
are compliant 
to this control 
The control is 










Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 

















to the root 
account to 









IOS can be 
Jail Broke, 
there is No 
mitigation that 
could prevent 











end users can 
jail break a 
device. Since 


















are entered on a 
user interface, the 
actual pass phrase 
is obscured by 
default. 
1 . R N/A NF 
 Apple device 
and product 
are compliant 
to this control 
Tested this 
control to 



















2 . O N/A NF 
 Apple device 
and product 
are compliant 
to this control 
Tested this 
control to 









Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 











    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 






A  & A  




User Access & 
Credentials 
15 








login bots, etc.) 




account(s) after a 
reasonable 
number of  
invalid login 
attempts 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple IOS 






to this control 
Per Apple  
EUA and  
User guide 
 6.30 
A  & A  














and /or out of 
band notice(s). 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 




(Due to not 
wanting to 
reset an Apple  
Account) 
Apple adheres 
to this control 
Per Apple  







Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 




7 -  Wired / Wi-Fi  & Ntwk elements  
7.21 
Wired /  


















the factory issued 
or reset password 
is unique to each 
device and is not 






1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 
2 adheres to 
this control 
Apple adheres 
to this control 
Per Apple  
EUA and  
User guide 
7.22 
Wired /  











Where a wireless 
communications 
interface requires 
an initial pairing 
process, a Strong  
Authentication 




the device or 
possession of a 





1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 
2 adheres to 
this control 
Apple adheres 
to this control 
Per Apple  









Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 











    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 






Wired /  

















the product. For 
example, 
Bluetooth 4.2 
rather than 4.0. 












support the  













3 is compliant  
Apple Watch 




Wired /  
Wi-Fi          
& Ntwk 
element  




Security –  




 Ensure a 














coming from a 
trusted source, 





1  > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 
to this control 
















Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 





Wired /  
Wi-Fi          
& Ntwk 
element  




Security –  




 Security update 
process must 









In certain cases, 
a user may want 
the ability to 



















may or may not 
provide user 
notice. 
1 > R N/A NF 












8 -  Cloud  &  Web UI (User Interface) 






Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 
















ensures that all 
Personal 
Information is 
encrypted at rest 
and in transit 
1  > R N/A NF 
 Apple EUA 
and privacy 
policies state 























personal data of 
users 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple adheres 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 




















possible and in 
any reporting. 
1  > R N/A NF 






used data / 
information 
Apple adheres 















There is a 
method or 
methods for the 






where it  
will be stored.  
1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 

























how they are 
used, limiting 










opt in for any 
other purposes. 







and the reason 
for collecting 
































1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 














Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 























the data may be 
transferred (e.g., 
a connected 
home being sold 
to a new owner 
or sale of a 
fitness tracker). 
1 > R N/A NF 
 Apple's EUA 
only discusses 
the transfer of 
the IOS and 
not the actual 
















Disclosures &  
Transparency 
27 
 Commit to not 
sell or transfer 
any identifiable 
consumer data 
unless it is a 
dependent part of 
the sale or 







policy does not 
materially 
change the terms. 
Otherwise notice 
and consent must 
be obtained 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 












Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 














Disclosures &  
Transparency 
28 
 Provide the 
ability for a 
consumer to 




practices that are 
presented prior to 
operation, 
provided that 
such terms are 
not 
conspicuously 
disclosed prior to 
purchase. The 
term (number of 
days) for product 
returns shall be 
consistent with 
current exchange 




1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 






















including but not 








and data transfer 
regulatory 
requirements 
1 > R N/A O 
Mitigation  
is to  
incorporate 









minors; it does 
not state that it  
adheres to  
COPPA 
Apple does 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 











    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 



















ability to reset a 
device  
and application to 
factory settings, 
including the 
ability to erase 
user data in the 
event of transfer, 
rental, loss or 
sale. 
1 > R N/A NF 
 
Apple Watch 





















including but not 
limited to email 
and SMS, must 
adopt 
authentication 












and notices as 
well as for 
parked domains 
and those that 
never send email 
1 > R N/A NF 
 























Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 






















users who  
may be  
vision, hearing 
and or mobility 
impaired to 
maximize 
access for users 
of all physical 
capabilities 
1 > O N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 

















 Where a device 
or devices can 
have their 
ownership 
transferred to a 
different owner, 








option must  
be available 
when a  
transfer of 
ownership occurs 
or when an end 




the service or 
device. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 












Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 










    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 

















Where a device 
or devices user 
wishes to end the 





the device and 
related services. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 Consumer 
data can be 
deleted from 
Apple watch 
2 and then the 
end user can 




data    
Tested this 
control to 
verify this  






















1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 




















ensures that the 
identity  
of the device is 
independent of 
the end user, to 
ensure anonymity 
and comply with 
relevant local 
data privacy laws  
e.g. GDPR in the 
EU. 
1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple adheres 






Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 









    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations   
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 

















ability to have 
access to their 
personally 
identifiable 
information (PII)  
maintained in its 
system(s) of 
records 




request access to 
records 



















1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple meets 












Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 









    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 
















to the public and 
to individuals 
regarding: 










information (PII);  
(ii) authority for 
collecting PII;  






PII and the 
consequences of 
exercising or not 
exercising those 
choices; and 
(iv) the ability to 
access and have 
PII amended or 
corrected if 
necessary 
1  > R N/A NF 
 
Apple states 

















Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 




Ref ID Seq 
# 
Title Description Requirement 
Compliance 
Class 
    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations  
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 












of Privacy  
Program 
Information 
a. Ensures that the public has 
access to information about its 
privacy activities and can 
communicate with Senior 
Officials for Senior Agency 
Official for Privacy (SAOP) 
b. Ensures that its privacy 
practices are publicly available 
through organizational websites 
or otherwise. 













UL-1 Internal  
Use 
The organization uses 
personally identifiable 
information (PII) internally only 
for the authorized purpose(s) 
identified in the Privacy Act 
and/or in public notices. 




how and what 
this data will 
be used for  
Since Apple 
is a private 
corporation it 
is not required 
to adhere to 
the privacy 











Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 




Ref ID Seq 
# 
Title Description Requirement 
Compliance 
Class 
    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  




NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 















a. Shares personally identifiable 
information (PII) externally, 
only for the authorized purposes 
identified in the Privacy Act 
and/or described in its notice(s) 
or for a purpose that is 
compatible with those purposes;  
b. Where appropriate, enters into 
a Memoranda of Understanding, 
Memoranda of Agreement, 
Letters of Intent, Computer 
Matching Agreements, or 
similar agreements, with third 
parties that specifically describe 
the PII covered and specifically 
enumerate the purposes for 
which the PII may be used; 
c. Monitors, audits, and trains its 
staff on the authorized sharing 
of PII with third parties 
and on the consequences of 
unauthorized use or sharing of 
PII 
d. Evaluates any proposed new 
instances of sharing PII with 
third parties to assess whether 
the sharing is authorized and 
whether additional or new 
public notice is required 




how and what 
persona data 













Table C1. (continued) 
Sections 
Organization 




Ref ID Seq 
# 
Title Description Requirement 
Compliance 
Class 
    Category Applicability 
R = Required    
O = Recom / Opt 
  
Consumers |Organizations   
Assessment 
Finding 
NF = No 
Finding. 
O=Open 





10  Test  &  Validate 
 
